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The Courage of
Civil Rights Lawyers:
Fred Gray and His Colleagues
Leonard S. Rubinowitz †
“You taught us courage—to be brave enough to do what we believe
is right—to know that fear is natural, but not to let it stop us
from doing what we must.” 1
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1.

Helen Shores Lee & Barbara S. Shores, The Gentle Giant of
Dynamite Hill: The Untold Story of Arthur Shores and His
Family’s Fight for Civil Rights 11 (2012). Helen Shores Lee and
Barbara Sylvia Shores, the daughters of Arthur Shores, wrote this in a tribute
to their father, an Alabama Civil Rights lawyer. Id. Arthur Shores’s contributions to the Civil Rights Movement are discussed infra Section I.B.
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Introduction
The modern Civil Rights Movement played out on a very public
stage, usually in the form of non-violent direct action in places such as
the streets and highways, lunch counters, buses and bus stations, and
even the Lincoln Memorial. Similarly, much of the opposition to nonviolent direct action took place in those public settings. That made it
obvious that civil rights leaders and activists had great courage to confront the system of Jim Crow. The courage of Civil Rights leaders and
their followers is well known. They faced dangers up to and including
death at the hands of segregationists seeking to preserve white supremacy.
In contrast, civil rights lawyers operated largely behind the scenes,
in the much less public confines of the federal and state courts. They
are known mostly for their successes in the judicial arena. 2 They rarely
participated in demonstrations, sit-ins, freedom rides, or marches, so
they did not encounter the fire hoses, attacking police dogs, tear gas,
and other tactics leveled at direct action activists.
Nevertheless, the lawyers’ lesser visibility did not protect them from
the many dangers of doing civil rights work. Segregationists recognized
that the lawyers posed a threat to the racially discriminatory system.
So, they included the lawyers in their counter-movement, seeking to
eliminate the lawyers, in hopes of undermining and defeating the Civil
Rights Movement. 3 As a result, the lawyers and their families also faced
2.

See generally Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Michelle Shaw & Michal Crowder, A
“Notorious Litigant” and “Frequenter Of Jails”: Martin Luther King, Jr., His
Lawyers, and the Legal System, 10 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 494, 566 (2016)
(“Starting in the 1930s, one of the prominent strands of civil rights work was
constitutional litigation challenging state-imposed segregation laws in the
South.”); Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice 360 (rev. ed. 2013) (“In the
final analysis, it was the lawsuits which really changed conditions in the
South and in this Nation.”); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts:
Legal Battles of the Civil Rights Movement 553 (Twelve Tables
Press 2004) (“[The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund] brought
court decisions to the people and plugged the current of moral and legal
authority into the transactions of everyday life.”); John A. Salmond, The
Conscience of a Lawyer: Clifford J. Durr and American Civil
Liberties, 1899–1975 (1990); Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 137 (describing the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision).

3.

See Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Perjury Trial: A
Potential Turning Point and a Footnote to History, 5 Ind. J.L. & Soc.
Equality 237, 240–41 (2017) (“As a lawyer, [Gov. John Patterson] relied
heavily on the legal system to accomplish his goal [to undermine and defeat
the Civil Rights movement in Alabama].”); Darlene Clark Hine, Jonathan
L. Entin & Leonard Rubinowitz, Session III: A Conversation About Fred
Gray: Rosa Parks' Lawyer and Dr. King's First Lawyer, 10 Nw. J. L. &
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significant risks. Their roles called for great courage. 4 This Article brings that aspect of the lawyers’ participation center stage.
This symposium pays richly deserved tribute to Alabama’s Fred
Gray, one of the most important lawyers of the modern Civil Rights
Movement. 5 Fred Gray and his colleagues demonstrated exceptional
courage in the challenges they faced, the risks they endured, and the
costs they and their families paid to do the critical work to advance the
cause. For present purposes, that courage can be divided into two
kinds. 6 Professional courage involves the willingness and ability to navigate a racist state legal system run by segregationists deeply committed
to protecting and sustaining the pervasive racial segregation and discrimination—including the police, opposing counsel such as prosecutors,
judges, and all-white juries. 7 Civil rights lawyers represented their
clients in high-stakes matters, with a system stacked against them and

Soc. Pol'y 640, 647 (2016) (quoting John Patterson saying “how obstructionist Fred Gray had been as a lawyer, and if they could have gotten rid of
him, then they could have won this like they could have won the Civil Rights
Movement.”); Darlene Clark Hine, Foreword to Fred Gray, Bus Ride to
Justice xiii (1995) (“Ex-Alabama governor and ardent segregationist John
Patterson confided in an interview that if any of the state-sanctioned maneuvers to remove Fred Gray from the city had worked then, the movement for
desegregation perhaps could have been stalled or put on hold for a generation
or more.”).
4.

Even the lawyers themselves referred to the courage required. Gray, supra
note 2, at 347; Arthur D. Shores, The Negro at the Bar: The South, 2 Nat'l
B.J. 266 (1944).

5.

See Hine, supra note 2, at xii (“[Fred Gray] was one of the chief architects
of the strategies that sustained the Montgomery Bus Protest and represented
Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. as well as other movement principals
in those tumultuous early years.”); Rubinowitz, supra note 2, at 507–08,
512–13, 544–49 (discussing Fred Gray’s extensive involvement in the Civil
Rights movement); Jonathan L. Entin, ‘Destroying Everything Segregated I
Could Find’: Fred Gray and Integration in Alabama, 7 Critical Rev. Int’l
Soc. & Pol. Phil. 252 (2004).

6.

U. W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Making Bricks Without Straw: The NAACP
Legal Defense Fund and the Development of Civil Rights Law in Alabama,
1940–1980, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 1121, 1127 (2001).

7.

That system was often referred to as the “southern way of life.” See generally
Wilma Dykeman, What is the Southern Way of Life, 44 Southwest Rev.
163 (1959). See also Gray, supra note 2, at 12, 75.
In many instances, the federal courts presented a similar challenge because
of the appointment of segregationist district judges. Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954–63, at 699–700
(1988); see, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower
Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Regan 167 (1997).
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their clients. 8 This was particularly the case during the modern Civil
Rights Movement in the South. 9 Professional courage went along with
the representation of those unpopular activists and unpopular causes.
However, the focus here will be on the personal courage that the
lawyers exhibited outside their work within the legal system. It is one
thing to face a racist system in court, the traditional setting for resolving legal disputes. It is quite another to encounter and withstand
extraordinary extra-legal and legal attempts to remove them from the
arena. Alabama of the 1950s and the following decades is a case in
point. Civil rights lawyers on the frontlines had great dedication and
commitment to the movement there. They stayed the course even
though they and their families—spouses, children, and other family
members—faced a multitude of efforts to terminate their involvement
in the movement. 10 They faced physical dangers that included house
8.

See generally Charles Morgan, Jr., Segregated Justice, in Southern Justice
155–64 (Leon Friedman ed., 1965); Rubinowitz, supra note 3 (discussing the
perjury prosecution of King initiated by John Patterson).

9.

Judges routinely disrespected the Black lawyers, some even turning their
backs or closing their eyes when the lawyers spoke. See, e.g., Maurice C.
Daniels, Saving the Soul of Georgia: Donald L. Hollowell and
the Struggle for Civil Rights 122 (2013) (describing an instance where
a trial judge spun around and turned his back as soon as Donald Hollowell
got up to speak); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A
Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 Yale L. J. 999, 1031
(1989) (describing an instance where a trial judge refused to allow the
NAACP general counsel to examine a witness). Opposing counsel demeaned
and disrespected them, and all-white juries made decisions that had little to
do with the law or the evidence and much to do with the race of their client.
See generally Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 257 (“That the conviction had no
basis in evidence reinforced Doctor King’s perception that any prosecution of
a Black defendant, especially a leader like him, would lead to a guilty verdict
from an all-white jury.”).
“Black” is capitalized wherever it refers to Black people, to indicate that
Blacks, or African Americans, are a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience, and identity—not just people of a particular
color. Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the culture, as it does
with Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. See generally Martha
Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in
Postwar New York City (2003); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation in Anti-Discrimination Law,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use
an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and
other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require
denotation as a proper noun.”).

10.

Other ideas of courage that fit with what these lawyers exemplified include:
1.

Grace under pressure. Douglas O. Linder & Nancy Levit, The
Good Lawyer: Seeking Quality in the Practice of Law 50
(2014).
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bombings and shots fired at their homes, as well as death threats. Also,
officials used legal and administrative strategies designed to remove
lawyers from the arena, including prosecutions for barratry and an
effort to draft one lawyer into the military. Moreover, lawyers in private
practice encountered two kinds of economic pressures—loss of clients
that threatened the sustainability of their practice and efforts to get
them to forego civil rights work in return for profitable legal business.
The lawyers and their families also endured social costs, which included
both ostracism and enforced isolation for their own protection. Finally,
their work had psychological tolls, which included anger, fear and anxiety, and grief and sadness. Some incidents and experiences were quite
traumatic, especially for family members, and required great resilience
to overcome them. 11

11.

2.

“Courage . . . is voluntary, requires judgment, and involves acts undertaken in the presence of some form of danger, risk, loss, or personal
cost.” Id. at 52.

3.

“Maya Angelou, called courage ‘the most important of all the virtues,
because without courage you can’t practice any other virtue consistently.’” Id. at 38, 301 n.3.

4.

“Courage, involving the exercise of will in the face of challenges . . .”
Id. at 65.

One accepted definition of individual trauma explains that it is “trauma from
an event, series of events, or set of circumstances, that is experienced by an
individual as physically or emotionally harmful or life threatening and has
lasting adverse effects on the individual’s functioning and mental, physical,
social, emotional, or spiritual well-being.” SAMHSA’s Trauma & Justice
Strategic Initiative, SAMHSA’S Concept of Trauma and Guidance
for a Trauma-Informed Approach (July 2014), http://store.samhsa
.gov/shin/content/SMA14-4884/SMA14-4884.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5SSKF5P]; see also Gene Griffin & Sarah Sallen, Considering Child Trauma
Issues in Juvenile Court Sentencing, 34 Child. Legal Rts. J. 1, 6 (2013)
(noting that the essential components of trauma include events, experiences,
and effects). Certain events the lawyers faced would clearly qualify as adverse
events that could cause trauma, specifically the many physical dangers and
the social isolation the lawyers and their families faced. See E-mail from
Eugene Griffin, J.D., Ph.D., former Dir. of Research, Child Trauma Acad.,
to author (Dec. 7, 2017, 3:57 PM) (on file with author); infra Parts II.A (discussing the physical danger to Civil Rights lawyers) and II.D (discussing the
social costs faced by Civil Rights lawyers).
Similarly, some of the lawyers described experiencing events as physically or
emotionally harmful. See infra Section II.E (discussing the psychological
burdens of racially targeted violence); note 170 (feeling visibly shaken and
perhaps scared); note 280 (recounting the most horrendous experience of my
life). Finally, many of the lawyers or their family members also showed effects
at the time of the event, including fight, flight, or freeze responses. See infra
note 158 (discussing Shores’s daughter getting a gun); note 274 (discussing
Shores’s wife urging family to move); note 208 (recounting Motley freezing in
the car); see Griffin E-mail, supra. Fortunately, the lawyers were very resilient, and coped with these events by taking steps to protect themselves both
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Like the activists, the lawyers continued to bring their talent and
their commitment to the movement notwithstanding the toll it took on
them and their families. 12 They showed the courage and resilience to
stay on track despite their adversaries’ best efforts to undermine them.
Their challenges came from the public sector—elected officials, prosecutors, and the police—as well as private individuals and white supremacist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan.
This Article focuses on the courage of Fred Gray and his colleagues
in Alabama during the modern Civil Rights Movement. Gray was born
and raised in the state and returned there after law school to “destroy
everything segregated [he] could find.” 13 He made the state his permanent home. 14 His civil rights career provides the context for this examination of the courageous aspects of this coterie of distinguished lawyers. Gray and the several colleagues discussed here faced more severe
personal challenges than the larger group of colleagues. In that sense,
they are not representative of that larger group. The lawyers discussed
were particularly prominent, persistent, and visible from early in the
movement. They represented a particular threat to the racial status
quo in Alabama, and they paid a heavy price for that. But none of
those efforts to remove Fred Gray or his colleagues succeeded.
Part I introduces Fred Gray and the several key colleagues whose
careers included many personal challenges and displays of great courage
in response to them. Those lawyers include Arthur Shores (Birmingham), Clifford Durr (Montgomery), Robert Carter (New York: NAACP
physically and emotionally. See infra notes 181 and 143 (armed guard’s fast
car); notes 261 and 299 (discussing supportive families). See Griffin E-mail,
supra.
12.

The impact on the lawyers’ families is captured in the sub-title of a biography
of Arthur Shores, one of Fred Gray’s close colleagues: “The Untold Story of
Arthur Shores and his Family’s Fight for Civil Rights.” Lee & Shores,
supra note 1. The book is a loving, admiring, and respectful account of their
father’s life and work by his two daughters (along with a professional writer);
but they also provide a straightforward and quite detailed picture of the toll
that their father’s civil rights lawyering took on his wife, and on them as
they were growing up. Id. See infra Part II (discussing the physical, legal,
economic, social, and psychological challenges faced by the Civil Rights
lawyers).

13.

Gray, supra note 2, at 5.

14.

When Martin Luther King moved back to his hometown of Atlanta at the
end of 1959, he invited Fred Gray to go with him and serve the Atlantabased Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which Dr. King
headed. Id. at 145. Gray declined the invitation because of his commitment
to ending all forms of segregation in Alabama. Id.
For background on Alabama during this period, see E. Culpepper Clark,
The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand at the University of Alabama xi–xii (1993).

1232

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017
The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers

Legal Defense Fund and NAACP), and Constance Baker Motley (New
York: NAACP Legal Defense Fund). This is a diverse group, by race,
gender and location—local lawyers in Alabama, as well as those who
came down from the North to challenge the Jim Crow system in the
state. They were all prominent lawyers who worked extensively with
Fred Gray, often becoming personal friends as well as important professional colleagues. 15 The small group of lawyers highlighted here
stands in for a number of other lawyers who worked with Fred Gray
over the years. 16
Part II identifies the personal challenges those lawyers faced and
provides accounts of specific incidents they encountered. 17 The dangers
were generally greater for the local lawyers, who were more visible, more
accessible, and more vulnerable than those coming from the North. The
most serious challenges involved physical dangers to both persons and
property. Rarely does representing clients, even unpopular ones, call for
physical courage; but these lawyers needed and displayed exceptional
amounts of it. 18 Other challenges to them and their families included
legal, economic, social, and psychological ones. Often these kinds of
risks interacted with each other. Bombings caused great fear and anxiety. Ostracism sometimes led to depression. The diversity of the
lawyers also led to some differences in the challenges. Local lawyers,
especially Arthur Shores, faced bombings and shootings, while northern
lawyers faced anger and hostility as “outside agitators.” 19
The Conclusion relates that history to the dangers facing civil rights
lawyers in the 21st century. It suggests that the need for personal courage continues, as the lawyers still encounter significant challenges and
threats.

15.

As such, the dangers they faced and the courage they exhibited often exceeded the experiences of other colleagues of Fred Gray. See infra Part II
(discussing the physical, legal, economic, social, and psychological challenges
faced by the Civil Rights lawyers).

16.

To supplement the discussion of the selected Alabama lawyers, footnote
references will include experiences of other Civil Rights lawyers in Alabama
and elsewhere.

17.

As Linder and Levit suggest, “Courage is a virtue best understood in the
context of stories . . . .” Linder & Levit, supra note 10, at 57.

18.

“In a lawyer, courage is a muscle. You develop courage by exercising it.
Sitting on the fence is not practice for standing up.” Id. at 36 (quoting
Professor Pamela S. Karlan).

19.

For segregationists, the appearance of northern lawyers was reminiscent of
the hated “carpetbaggers” that came South during the period of Reconstruction after the Civil War. See generally Bruce E. Baker, What Reconstruction Meant: Historical Memory in the American South 69
(2007) (“The historical memory of . . . carpetbaggers as meddling and manipulative.”).
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I. Fred Gray and His Colleagues
In addition to Fred Gray himself, this Part introduces several lawyers who worked with him on civil rights matters in Alabama. These
lawyers stand in for the larger numbers of Gray’s colleagues. They are
among the most prominent lawyers among the larger group. They also
suggest the diversity of Gray’s colleagues—in race, gender, and location.
Moreover, they each worked with Fred Gray extensively, over a number
of years. Finally, they were among those who faced the most difficult
challenges and therefore demonstrated the greatest personal courage. 20
Fred Gray was such a central figure in Alabama that his colleagues
included virtually all the civil rights lawyers in the state as well as those
who came there from the North. 21 On the rare occasion that Gray was
not actively involved in an Alabama movement, his colleagues were.22
This examination of Fred Gray and his colleagues considers lawyers
who faced personal challenges, showed the courage to overcome them,
and played a critical role in the modern Civil Rights Movement in
Alabama.
A. Fred Gray

Fred Gray was born and raised in Montgomery and graduated from
its historically Black Alabama State College. 23 Gray would have
attended law school in Alabama, but the University of Alabama still
did not admit Blacks in the early 1950s. 24 When Gray left to attend
20.

Other colleagues of Fred Gray are introduced briefly in the footnotes to this
section.

21.

This is largely due to Gray following the advice of a law professor to “always
seek assistance and never be afraid to share a fee with an older lawyer who
has more experience.” Gray, supra note 2, at 17.
The northern lawyers included both those who worked with Gray on a recurring basis as well as those involved on a single occasion. See, e.g., id. at
72–73, 149 (discussing various northern colleagues, including: Robert Carter,
Thurgood Marshall, Hubert Delaney, and Robert Ming).

22.

See Rubinowitz, supra note 2, at 590–92, 598–604; J. Mills Thornton III,
Dividing Lines: Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil
Rights in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma 141–379 (2002);
Branch, supra note 7, at 688–810; Glenn T. Eskew, But for
Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil
Rights Struggle (1997).

23.

Gray, supra note 2, at 6, 10–12. The college is now Alabama State University.
Id. at 10; see also 149 Years of Leadership, Ala. St. U., http://www.
alasu.edu/about-asu/history--tradition/149-years-of-leadership/index.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LGW2-A9Y7] (last visited March 15, 2016).

24.

See Gray, supra note 2, at 13–15; Entin, supra note 5, at 253; Bill Lubinger,
A Legal Legend, Think Mag. (2004), http://case.edu/think/fall2014/fredgray.html [https://perma.cc/4E7L-MYTE]. Even though the U.S. Supreme
Court held in 1950 that it was unconstitutional for state law schools to
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Cleveland’s Western Reserve Law School, he made a secret vow to return to his home state and use his legal training to “destroy everything
segregated [he] could find.” 25 That mission began with the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, when Gray was just twenty-four years old. 26
1. The Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955)

When Gray opened his law office in Montgomery in 1954, he had
difficulty finding clients. 27 In order to build a network for his practice,
Gray became active in the local branch of the NAACP, through which
he became friends with Rosa Parks. 28 That led to his serving as her
defense counsel after she refused to give up her bus seat, which led to
him becoming the lawyer for the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the
Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA). 29 That also gave Gray
the distinction of being Martin Luther King Jr.’s first lawyer. 30
Rosa Parks’s case triggered the Montgomery Bus Boycott, a yearlong protest that helped bring about the end of segregation on the city’s
bus system. 31 During the boycott, Fred Gray filed a lawsuit in federal

exclude applicants because of their race, see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950) (holding exclusion of an applicant to the University of Texas Law
School because of his race unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because no equivalent law school existed for
Blacks), the University of Alabama continued its racially discriminatory policy.
See Gray, supra note 2, at 14–15 (explaining how the university imposed
strategic financial barriers to entry designed to keep Black students out).
25.

Gray, supra note 2, at 13. The university is now Case Western Reserve
University. See History, Case W. Res. U., http://www.case.edu/about/
history [https://perma.cc/LG8N-2Q97] (last visited Dec. 20, 2016); C.H.
Cramer, Case Western Reserve: A History of the University,
1826–1976, at 281 (1976).

26.

Gray, supra note 2, at 6.

27.

Entin, supra note 5, at 255; Gray, supra note 2, at 28–31.

28.

Gray, supra note 2, at 31.

29.

Id. at 50, 53. With the activities leading to the beginning of the bus boycott,
Gray recognized that his “days of having little to do in [his] fledgling law
practice were over.” Id. at 52; accord Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1030 n.198
(noting that Gray’s legal career changed dramatically after he represented
Rosa Parks).

30.

As Gray said, “I feel honored and proud that I was Dr. King’s first lawyer
in the civil rights movement. . . . Martin was to have many other lawyers
on other occasions, but I was his first.” Gray, supra note 2, at 145.

31.

See Branch, supra note 7, at 131–207 (1988); Daybreak of Freedom:
The Montgomery Bus Boycott (Stewart Burns ed., 1997); Thornton,
supra note 22, at 20–140. See also Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee
& Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation:
Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 663, 684
(2005). When Blacks returned to the buses in December 1956, the bus
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court challenging the constitutionality of the local and state laws requiring segregation on city buses. 32 The three-judge district court held
company ceased the long-standing humiliating treatment and enforced
segregation that had brought about the movement. Id. at 697–98.
During the boycott, Gray and his colleagues also represented Dr. King and
eighty-nine others arrested under an Anti-Boycott Statute. Only Dr. King
was prosecuted, and he was found guilty, even though the prosecution had
presented no evidence to show that Dr. King used violence or intimidation
to enforce the boycott, as required by the state supreme court’s interpretation
of the statute. Lash v. State, 244 Ala. 48 (Ala. 1943); Gray, supra note 2,
at 84, 88–89; Thornton, supra note 22, at 89. Gray appealed, but the appeal
was dismissed on a technicality. King v. State, 98 So. 2d 443, 444 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1957); Gray, supra note 2, at 89.
32.

See Gray, supra note 2, at 71–73, 77; Thornton, supra note 22, at 71;
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff’d 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.
Ala. 1956).
Other Alabama lawyers worked with Gray, including Orzell Billingsley,
Peter Hall, and Charles Langford. All three were involved with Dr. King’s
movements early on, working with Gray on Browder v. Gayle, as well as
representing those charged with violating the anti-boycott statute. See
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 225–26; Gray, supra note 2, at 72, 88. Orzell
Billingsley graduated from Howard University Law School in 1950, and
became one of the first Black lawyers in Alabama. Bravery and Vision: Black
Firsts in Birmingham, Birmingham Pub. Libr., http://www.bplonline.org/
resources/BlackBirmingham.aspx [https://perma.cc/DJF9-MTSN] (last updated Jan. 23, 2014); see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 38. Billingsley
defended Gray in his barratry case, and worked with Gray on Alabama v.
Anderson. Id. at 213. He was heavily involved in voter registration efforts as
a legal advisor to the NAACP, as well as active in other civil rights cases in
Alabama. See 3 The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a
New Age, December 1955–December 1956, at 184 n.4 (Clayborne Carson
et. al. eds., 1997) (“An NAACP legal advisor, [Billingsley] was active in voter
registration and . . . repeatedly challenged the exclusion of African Americans
from Alabama juries.”); Sherrel Wheeler Stewart, Civil Rights Lawyer Orzell
Billingsley Dead at 77, Birmingham News, Dec. 19, 2001, at 1C (noting
Billingsley’s efforts in support of Civil Rights in Alabama).
Peter Hall was one of the first Black lawyers in Birmingham, where he
worked in private practice with Arthur Shores and Orzell Billingsley. See
Mignette Y. Patrick Dorsey, Speak Truth to Power 53 (2010); Jon
Solomon, Pete Hall: Son of Birmingham’s First Black Judge Gains History
Lesson About his Dad, AL.com (Feb. 21 2013, 8:00 AM), http://
blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/02/pete_hall_son_of_birminghams_f.html
[https://perma.cc/QWW4-AAXP]. He also served as the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF)’s local counsel in Birmingham. 3 The Papers of
Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a New Age, December 1955–
December 1956, at 184 (Clayborne Carson et. al. eds., 1997). Hall defended
Gray in his barratry case, and worked with Gray on Alabama v. Anderson.
See infra note 70. In 1965, Hall joined Gray and others in protecting the
Selma-to-Montgomery march for voting rights. See infra notes 66–69 and
accompanying text. He was a founding member of the Alabama Black
Lawyers Association, and secured significant victories in several civil rights
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that the segregation laws were unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision in
Gayle v. Browder. 33
2. NAACP v. Alabama 34

Gray assisted on another major case in 1956, when John Patterson,
Alabama Attorney General, sued the NAACP in an attempt to remove
the organization from the state. 35 He argued that the NAACP was a
foreign corporation not qualified to do business in Alabama. 36 He
obtained an order compelling the NAACP to provide its membership
list as part of the state’s assessment of the organization. 37 The
organization refused to comply because of the harm that would cause
both the individual members and the NAACP itself. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court found that the state could not constitutionally compel the
cases before becoming Birmingham’s first Black judge in 1972. Rubinowitz,
supra note 2, at 514.
Charles Langford was the only Black lawyer in Montgomery until Fred Gray
joined him. Langford was known as the “Dean of African American Lawyers
in Montgomery.” Gray, supra note 2, at 26, 322. Langford defended Gray
in his barratry case, and later became Fred Gray’s law partner. 3 The
Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a New Age, December 1955–December 1956, at 70 n.9 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1997).
In addition to his legal contributions to the Civil Rights Movement, Langford
had a distinguished political career. He was elected to the Alabama legislature
in 1978, serving two terms in the Alabama House of Representatives and
then five terms in the Alabama Senate before retiring in 2002. Alabama
Senator Charles Langford; Rosa Parks’s Lawyer, Wash. Post, Feb. 13,
2007, at B7.
33.

See generally Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1050–51 (discussing the district
court’s decision). Local officials sought review by the Supreme Court, which
accepted the case, but did not schedule oral arguments. Gayle, 352 U.S. at
903 (“The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.”).

34.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).

35.

Gray, supra note 2, at 105; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 449.

36.

Gray, supra note 2, at 105.

37.

Gene Howard, Patterson for Alabama: The Life and Career of
John Patterson 100–02 (2008); Alan Edwin Grady, The Campaign for
Decency: John Patterson as Alabama Attorney General, 1955–1959: A
Thesis, 116 (Dec. 1992) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alabama)
(on file with M. Louis Salmon Library, University of Alabama); Branch,
supra note 7, at 186–87.

38.

Joseph Mark Bagley, School Desegregation, Law and Order, and Litigating
Social Justice in Alabama, 1954–1973, 110 (Jan. 5, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgia State University), http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history
_diss/37 [https://perma.cc/7P43-V6E6]; Gilbert Jonas, Freedom’s
Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle Against Racism in America,
1909–1969, at 162–64 (2005) (discussing the frequency with which NAACP
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provision of the membership list, but the state managed to prolong the
litigation and keep the NAACP from operating in the state for eight
years. 39
3. Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)

Also in the late 1950s, Fred Gray challenged the constitutionality
of an Alabama statute that changed the city limits of Tuskegee from a
square to a “25 sided sea dragon.” 40 The legislation was clearly intended
to exclude nearly all Black voters, while keeping all white voters in the
city. 41 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 42 Gray argued that the redrawing of
the city’s boundaries was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth amendments. 43 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
struck down the statute as racially discriminatory, restoring the city to
its original square shape. 44
leaders and other Black activists lost their jobs, livelihoods, or were violently
attacked and even killed as a result of their activism).
39.

Gray, supra note 2, at 106. Patterson originally filed a lawsuit seeking an
injunction on NAACP activities in the state, which the segregationist circuit
judge granted. When the NAACP appealed the injunction, Patterson asked
the court to first order the production of NAACP records, including a member list. The NAACP refused to comply with the order, and thus was held
in contempt and unable to litigate the injunction. The NAACP appealed to
the Supreme Court, which in 1958 reversed and remanded the contempt
citation. The Alabama Supreme Court held the organization in contempt for
a different reason and maintained the injunction. In 1959, the U.S. Supreme
Court again reversed the contempt order and ordered the state to hear the
case, and the state court simply did not do so. Next, NAACP attorneys sued
in federal court seeking an injunction against the next Governor of Alabama.
The Court again ordered the Alabama Supreme Court to hear the case, which
they did, and found in favor of the state. When the NAACP appealed that
ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held the state court judgment unconstitutional and ordered the state to finally lift the ban on NAACP operations in
the state. See Bagley, supra note 38, at 104–12; NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S.
240 (1959), NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16 (1961); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.
Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).

40.

Gray, supra note 2, at 113.

41.

Gray, supra note 2, at 113–14.

42.

364 U.S. 339 (1960).

43.

Id. (holding that the creation of electoral district boundaries in order to
disenfranchise Blacks violated the 15th Amendment); Gray, supra note 2,
at 115.

44.

In order to show that there could be no reasonable (non-discriminatory)
purpose to the new borders, Gray commissioned a large map, which he displayed during oral argument in the Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter
quickly acknowledged the map, and asked Gray to show him where Tuskegee
Institute was located on the map. Gray replied that Tuskegee Institute was
no longer in the city of Tuskegee. Gray believed that the map played a large
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4. Dr. King’s Perjury Trial (1960)

In 1960, Gray served on the defense team for what was perhaps Dr.
King’s most important trial. 45 The state of Alabama indicted Dr. King
role in the decision, which restored the Tuskegee city boundaries to their
original position. The Supreme Court declared Alabama Act 140 to be unconstitutional and barred officials from enforcing it. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at
339; Gray, supra note 2, at 115–19.
After Tuskegee, Gray argued other voting discrimination cases, including
Sellers v. Trussell, 253 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (declaring unconstitutional an Alabama Act designed to delay an election and extend the terms
of incumbent white commissioners, whose challengers were Black), and
Smith v. Paris, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding unconstitutional a
resolution clearly designed to dilute the newly increased Black vote). See also
Gray, supra note 2, at 245–53.
45.

Gray, supra note 2, at 155; see generally Rubinowitz, supra note 3; Edgar
Dyer, A “Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin
Luther King, Jr., 88 J. Afr. Am. Hist. 245, 260 (2003). By this time, Dr.
King had moved back to his home town of Atlanta. The reasons for his
relocation included enabling him to focus on his work as President of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which was based there. Adam
Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern
Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. 51
(1987) (discussing SCLC work needs in Atlanta and the region); David J.
Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference 123–24 (Perennial Classics, 1986) (stressing that the move was due to increasing demand for SCLC
leadership in the region, as well as Atlanta).
The all-Black defense team included a half dozen lawyers. See Gray, supra
note 2, at 149 (naming Hubert Delany, William Ming, Arthur Shores, Solomon
Seay Jr., and himself as the lawyers selected to represent Dr. King, and
stating that Ming added Chauncey Eskridge as a tax expert); Clarence B.
Jones & Joel Engel, What Would Martin Say? 6–7, 10–16 (2008)
(naming Clarence Jones as part of Dr. King’s perjury defense team); Dyer,
supra, at 251 (describing the defense team’s organization and preparation).
William Robert Ming and Hubert Delany were the two lead attorneys. Ming
was a Black Civil Rights lawyer from Chicago. James McElhatton, Standing
on the Shoulders of Bob Ming, Wash. Times (Dec. 7, 2008), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/7/standing-on-the-shoulders-of-bobming/ [https://perma.cc/L7TJ-NPCG]. While not of record in the case,
Ming also worked with Gray and the rest of the legal team to help prepare
them for oral arguments in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Gray,
supra note 2, at 117. Ming worked on numerous Supreme Court cases
throughout his career, including Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See supra McElhatton (“Mr. Ming worked with Supreme Court Justice-tobe Marshall in Brown.”). He also taught at Howard Law School and later at
the University of Chicago Law School. Id.
Hubert Delany was a Black lawyer who served as a justice in Domestic
Relations Court in New York from 1942 to 1955, after which he engaged in
private practice for many years. George James, Hubert T. Delany, 89, ExJudge and Civil Rights Advocate, Dies, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 1990), http://
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for perjury, alleging that he falsified his 1956 and 1958 state income tax
returns. 46 The prosecution accused Dr. King of under-reporting his
income in those years, which was normally viewed as the misdemeanor
of tax evasion. 47 Instead, the state charged Dr. King with perjury, a

www.nytimes.com/1990/12/31/obituaries/hubert-t-delany-89-ex-judge-and-civilrights-advocate-dies.html [https://perma.cc/QR8E-WCPW]. He was an early
civil rights advocate, serving on the boards of the NAACP and LDF for
many years. Id.
Solomon Seay Jr. also served on the defense team. After graduating from
Howard Law in 1957, he returned home to join the civil rights struggle as
the third Black lawyer in Montgomery. Selma to Montgomery March Profiles,
NAACP LDF (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/selmamontgomery-march-profiles-ldf-co-counsel-charles-stephen-ralston-fred-d-grayand [https://perma.cc/NH4Y-6Z59]. Seay devoted his career to “challenging
segregation and discrimination across the State of Alabama,” and it is
therefore fitting that he became law partners with Fred Gray. Gray, supra
note 2, at 28; LDF Mourns Passing of Legendary Civil Rights Attorney
Solomon Seay Jr., NAACP LDF (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/
press-release/ldf-mourns-passing-legendary-civil-rights-attorney-solomonseay-jr/ [https://perma.cc/ZH3R-P2AE] [hereinafter LDF Release].
Early on in their partnership, Seay worked with Gray as both a member of
Dr. King’s defense team for the 1960 Alabama perjury trial and then in
representing the four Black ministers, including his father, in the related New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan libel litigation. Gray, supra note 2, at 149, 156–
57; Donald T. Ferron, Notes on MIA Executive Board Meeting (Jan. 30,
1956), in 3 The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a New
Age, December 1955–December 1956, supra note 32, at 109, 111 n.6. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964). See infra Section I.A.5
(discussing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan). He also worked with Gray on a
number of cases involving school desegregation and voter discrimination,
including Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, Alabama State Teachers
Ass’n v. Alabama Public School and College Authority, Carr v. Montgomery
Board of Education, and Smith v. Paris. Gray, supra note 2, at 204, 209;
see infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Paris); see also
infra Section I.A.6 (discussing the school desegregation cases).
Additionally, in 1971, Seay worked with Fred Gray on Strain v. Philpot, a
case which dealt with Auburn University’s discriminatory treatment of their
employees. 331 F. Supp. 836 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Gray, supra note 2, at 197–
98. In 1991, Seay went to court again on that same case, this time partnering
with Fred Gray, Jr. Id. at 199. Other cases Seay and Fred Gray partnered
on included protecting Freedom Riders and other civil rights demonstrators,
discrimination in farm programs, and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study case. Id.
at 175–78, 125–28, 128–32, 281–90. See infra notes 68, 70 (discussing the cases
Williams v. Wallace, Henderson v. ASCS, and Pollard v. U.S.).
46.

See Branch, supra note 7, at 276–311; Garrow, supra note 45, at 129–37;
Gray, supra note 2, at 146; Dyer, supra note 45, at 248; Rubinowitz, supra
note 3.

47.

Dyer, supra note 45, at 248; Gray, supra note 2, at 147; Rubinowitz, supra
note 3.
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felony subject to a possible total ten-year prison sentence. 48 Much to
Dr. King’s and his lawyers’ surprise, the all-white jury acquitted him.49
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1960)

In the lead-up to Dr. King’s perjury trial, his supporters took out a
full-page advertisement in the New York Times to raise money needed
for his legal defense and other civil rights activities. 50 The ad made
general claims about pervasive segregation and discrimination in Alabama, and included the names of four Black Montgomery ministers as
supporting those claims. 51 Several Montgomery public officials, citing
factual errors in describing alleged incidents of racial discrimination,
sued the New York Times and the four Black ministers for libel, each
seeking $500,000 in damages from each defendant.52 Fred Gray served
on the four ministers’ defense team. 53 The ministers had not given
permission to use their names, nor were they even aware of the
advertisement. 54 Nevertheless, the jury found for the plaintiffs, and
awarded the full amount of damages requested. 55 Eventually, the
Supreme Court overturned the state court decision in the landmark
libel case of New York Times v. Sullivan. 56
48.

Dyer, supra note 45, at 254, 258; Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 239.

49.

See Dyer, supra note 45, at 258; Gray, supra note 2, at 154.
Gray stated in his autobiography that this was the first time in his career
that an all-white jury returned a verdict in favor of a Black person. Gray,
supra note 2, at 154. For a discussion of possible reasons for the jury’s
verdict, see Rubinowitz, supra note 3, at 253–74.

50.

Gray, supra note 2, at 148; see Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The
Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (1991).

51.

See Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, reprinted
in Lewis, supra note 50, at 2–3.

52.

Gray, supra note 2, at 156; Lewis, supra note 50, at 33. Branch, supra
note 7, at 289.
Governor John Patterson filed a separate libel suit, including Dr. King as a
defendant and seeking one million dollars in damages. Id. at 312; Lewis,
supra note 50, at 13.

53.

Gray, supra note 2, at 156.

54.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964); Fred D. Gray, The
Sullivan Case: A Direct Product of the Civil Rights Movement, 42 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1223, 1226 (1992). Gray’s work on the case was limited to the
local trial. Gray, supra note 2, at 162.

55.

Gray, supra note 2, at 159–61; Lewis, supra note 50, at 33.

56.

Gray, supra note 2, at 163–64; see Lewis, supra note 50, at 140–52. The
Court held that a libel suit by public officials required proof of actual malice,
and that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient to support
the judgment against the defendants. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80, 285–88.
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6. School Desegregation Litigation

Later, Fred Gray worked on a number of school desegregation cases
throughout Alabama. 57 In 1962, he represented two Black students
attempting to enroll at the University of Alabama. 58 The district court
ordered the students admitted to the university. 59
In 1963, Gray filed Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,60
which quickly led to a court order to desegregate the schools in Macon
County, the county surrounding Tuskegee. 61 Blacks and whites were
57.

See, e.g., Carr v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (1964)
(holding that schools in Montgomery must be desegregated); Ala. State
Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. and Coll. Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D.
Ala. 1968), aff’d per curium, 393 U.S. 400 (1969) (holding constitutional the
creation of a new university in Montgomery where it was clearly an attempt
to maintain the dual race education system); Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp.
724 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (holding that Auburn University requiring graduation
from an accredited institution for admission to graduate school, where there
are no accredited institutions open to Blacks, violates equal protection, and
the student must be admitted); Gray, supra note 2, at 191–92, 200–03, 285–
90.

58.

Gray, supra note 2, at 187. Earlier, the courts had ordered Black applicant
Autherine Lucy to be admitted to the University of Alabama, only to have
the university’s trustees expel her because of the violent resistance to her
presence on campus. See Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) (ordering the
desegregation of the University of Alabama); Glenn T. Eskew, But for
Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil
Rights Struggle 72 (1997) (noting Autherine Lucy’s desegregation case
against the University of Alabama).

59.

Gray, supra note 2, at 187. The two students, Vivian Malone and James
Hood, both enrolled at the University of Alabama, though Hood later withdrew for personal reasons. Id.

60.

231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964).

61.

Gray, supra note 2, at 204–05. In 1964, the district court ordered the state
not to interfere with school districts that were choosing to desegregate. Lee,
231 F. Supp. at 743; Gray, supra note 2, at 209. When the state failed to
follow that order, the district court entered a detailed order with a plan for
the desegregation of all school districts in Alabama not already under a
desegregation order. Lee v. Macon Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458
(M.D. Ala. 1967); Gray, supra note 2, at 209–10. This included not just
primary schools, but also junior colleges, trade schools, etc., if under state
control. Gray, supra note 2, at 210. The Lee v. Macon County cases were
still active in the courts well into the 21st century. Gray, supra note 2, at
212–13.
Jack Greenberg also worked on the case, as well as others involving school
desegregation. Jack Greenberg was a white, Jewish attorney who worked for
LDF for thirty-five years. Greenberg, supra note 2, at xviii, 46. During
that time, Greenberg argued forty cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and
hundreds more in the lower courts, in areas such as school desegregation,
employment discrimination, and the death penalty. Id. at xviii. Greenberg
worked on multiple cases alongside Gray, on issues from discrimination in
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moving towards peaceful desegregation when Governor George Wallace
sent state troopers to prevent the desegregation, and ordered the Tuskegee public schools closed. 62 Fred Gray realized that if Wallace had the
power to close a single district’s public schools to prevent desegregation,
then he also had the power to enforce desegregation throughout the
state. 63 Gray filed paperwork to convert the local case to a state-wide
one. 64 In 1967, the district court ordered the governor and the State
Board of Education to desegregate all of Alabama’s public schools. 65
7. Selma Voting Rights Movement (1965)

In another important case, Gray worked to protect the rights of
activists fighting for the right to vote. After the infamous “Bloody Sunday” attack by state troopers on peaceful marchers leaving Selma on
the highway for the state capitol in Montgomery fifty miles away,
protesters planned another march on that route to demand the constitutional right to vote. 66 Fred Gray filed Williams v. Wallace, 67 seeking
the district court’s permission to carry out the march and require state
protection for the marchers. 68 The court granted an injunction preventing state officials from interfering with the march and held that the
marchers were entitled to police protection along the route. 69

farm programs to seeking protection for civil rights demonstrators. See infra
Sections I.A.7–8 (analyzing two cases, Henderson v. ASCS and Williams v.
Wallace). They mostly worked together on school desegregation and voter
discrimination cases, such as Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, Alabama State Teachers Ass’n v. Alabama Public School and College
Authority, Sellers v. Trussell, and Smith v. Paris. See supra Section I.A.3 (discussing Gomillion v. Lightfoot); Gray, supra note 2, at 200–03, 245–53, 285–
90. Greenberg left LDF in 1984 to become Dean of Columbia College, and
later became a professor at Columbia Law School. Greenberg, supra note
2, at xviii.
62.

Gray, supra note 2, at 205–06.

63.

Gray, supra note 2, at 206–07. Gray said the realization hit him “like the
burning bush speaking to Moses,” and his team prepared the new court
documents that same night. Id. at 207.

64.

Gray, supra note 2, at 207–08.

65.

Gray, supra note 2, at 208–10; Lee v. Macon Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 267 F.
Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967).

66.

Gray, supra note 2, at 216.

67.

240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).

68.

Gray, supra note 2, at 216; Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 100 (holding that civil
rights demonstrators were entitled to protection from violence along the
march).

69.

Gray, supra note 2, at 216–17; Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 100.
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8. Tuskegee Syphilis Study (1973)

In 1973, Fred Gray filed suit against the federal government relating to the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis study. 70 Beginning in 1932, more
than 600 Black men were studied to observe the effects of untreated
syphilis. 71 The participants did not know what was being studied, did
not know they had syphilis, and did not consent to or even know they
were being studied. 72 They did not learn until 1972, from media reports,
that there even was such a study. 73 Gray eventually settled the suit,
and all the participants, or their heirs, received some form of payment.74
Gray believed that this study never would have happened with white
participants, and therefore considered this yet another milestone towards “destroying everything segregated which [he] could find.” 75
As this chronology suggests, Fred Gray played a central role in the
Civil Rights Movement in Alabama for decades. The following sections
introduce his colleagues who, along with Gray himself, will serve as the
focus of Part II on the challenges and courage of the lawyers. The
70.

Gray, supra note 2, at 298. Pollard v. U.S., 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala.
1974).
Gray worked on a number of other civil rights cases. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Ala., 366 U.S. 208 (1961) (overturning Anderson’s manslaughter conviction
for the accidental death of a Black man in a traffic accident, where Anderson
was a civil rights activist state officials were hoping to remove, and it was
clear that was the purpose of the indictment); Mitchell. v. Johnson, 250 F.
Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (granting an injunction against discrimination in
jury selection in Macon County); Henderson v. ASCS, 317 F. Supp. 430 (M.D.
Ala. 1970) (striking as unconstitutional the racially discriminatory election
process for the committees in charge of farm subsidies, conservation grants,
and certain agriculture related payments). See also Gray, supra note 2, at
102–23, 121–28.

71.

Gray, supra note 2, at 294–95. Only poor, rural, Black males were recruited
for this study. Id. at 295.

72.

Gray, supra note 2, at 295.

73.

Gray, supra note 2, at 296–97.

74.

Gray, supra note 2, at 300. It took almost another twenty years to
address the payments, verify heirs, etc. Id.

75.

Gray, supra note 2, at 301.
Fred Gray also had many accomplishments outside the courtroom, both
before and after the Tuskegee Syphilis Study case. After an unsuccessful run
in 1966, Gray was elected to the Alabama House of Representatives in 1970,
serving one four-year term. Gray, supra note 2, at 260, 264–65. In 1979,
President Carter nominated Gray to be a federal district judge in Alabama,
though the nomination was ultimately withdrawn. Gray, supra note 2, at
303, 311. In 1985, Gray became the president of the National Bar Association
(the Black bar association), and in 2001, Gray was elected president of the
Alabama Bar Association, the first Black lawyer to serve in that office.
Gray, supra note 2, at 318, 372.
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discussion includes Alabama lawyers Arthur Shores and Clifford Durr,
and northern lawyers Robert Carter and Constance Baker Motley, as
representatives of the larger group of colleagues who worked with Gray
during that period.
B. Arthur Shores

Birmingham’s Arthur Shores graduated from Chicago’s LaSalle
University Law School in 1935, and passed the Alabama bar exam in
1937. 76 He started doing civil rights cases shortly thereafter, filing lawsuits against voter discrimination, employment discrimination, racial
zoning ordinances, and police brutality. 77 During the 1930s and 1940s,
Shores was the only civil rights lawyer in Alabama. 78 Colleagues often
referred to him as the Dean of Alabama African-American lawyers. 79
Shores was a very important mentor to Fred Gray. 80 Gray described
Shores as one of four people who affected his career in extremely important ways. 81 Shores worked with Gray on many of his most important
cases, including Browder v. Gayle (challenging bus segregation laws),
Alabama v. NAACP (challenging the exclusion of the NAACP from the
state), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot (challenging the redrawing of the
Tuskegee boundaries that excluded most Blacks from the city). 82
76.

Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 66–68; Thornton, supra note 22, at
154. He attended law school through extension courses, while working
as a high school principal in Alabama. After failing the bar exam on
his first two tries, a sympathetic judge offered to tutor him in order to
help him pass on the third try. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 66–68.

77.

Thornton, supra note 22, at 154–55; Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 84–
85. See infra Section II.A (discussing the physical danger to Civil Rights
lawyers).

78.

Gray, supra note 2, at 35; Thornton, supra note 22, at 154, 178. Though
he did many civil rights cases, Shores opposed direct action, including the
Birmingham movement of 1963. He strongly preferred compromise, and only
filed suit if necessary. See Branch, supra note 7, at 768, 901.

79.

Gray, supra note 2, at 54.

80.

Id. at 35. He also mentored many other Black lawyers in the state. Id.

81.

Id. at 347–48. Gray said that when he was considering law school he thought
“if Arthur Shores could be a Civil Rights lawyer, so can I.” Id. at 347. When
Gray needed affidavits from attorneys to sit for the bar exam, Shores signed
one and helped him collect others. Id. During his early career, Shores assisted
him on cases “in any capacity requested.” Id. When Gray became President
of the National Bar Association, he started the Hall of Fame “primarily to
honor Shores.” Id.

82.

Id. at 72, 105, 115. He also represented those charged with violating the antiboycott statute during the Montgomery Bus Boycott. See id. at 88; Gayle
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See supra Section
I.A.1–3.
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Shores also worked on numerous school desegregation cases. Along
with Thurgood Marshall, Shores represented Autherine Lucy, who, in
1953, gained admission to the University of Alabama. 83 However, she
was expelled three days later, after which the University remained
segregated for ten more years. 84 In 1963, Shores, Gray, and Thurgood
Marshall won the case that finally desegregated the University of
Alabama. 85
C. Clifford Durr

Clifford Durr was a lawyer from a prominent white Montgomery
family. 86 He was a Rhodes Scholar, and received a law degree from
Oxford University in 1922. 87 After brief stints in law firms in Montgomery, Milwaukee, and Birmingham, Durr moved to Washington D.C.

83.

Gray, supra note 2, at 186–87; Eskew, supra note 22, at 22; Lucy v. Adams,
350 U.S. 1 (1955).
Thurgood Marshall, the leading Civil Rights lawyer of his generation, headed
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) from 1939 to 1961.
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 30, 295; William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to
Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 58 (1991). Marshall created the legal strategy of test cases that led to the landmark case of Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Richard Kluger,
Simple Justice 185–98 (1st Vintage Books ed. 2004). He led the team of
lawyers that brought the issue to the Supreme Court, and argued the final
case himself before the Court. NAACP LDF, Landmark: Brown v. Board of
Education, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/brown-v-board-education [https://
perma.cc/W7H2-L8WT] (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
Fred Gray turned to Marshall and his colleague Robert Carter for assistance
early in the Montgomery Bus Boycott because of their experience and expertise
in civil rights law. Gray, supra note 2, at 70, 72. See supra Section I.A.6
(discussing the school desegregation cases). They co-counselled Gayle v.
Browder, the Supreme Court decision holding the bus segregation laws unconstitutional. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Gray, supra note 2,
at 72–73. Thurgood Marshall went on to serve on the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals from 1961 to 1965 and as Solicitor General from 1965 to 1967.
Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary 296,
317 (2004). In 1967, President Johnson appointed him to the Supreme Court,
where he served until 1991. Id. at 330–31, 391.

84.

Gray, supra note 2, at 187. See supra Section I.A.6 (discussing the school
desegregation cases).

85.

Gray, supra note 2, at 186–87. See supra Section I.A.6 (discussing the
school desegregation cases).

86.

Salmond, supra note 2, at 1–2; Gray, supra note 2, at 44.

87.

Salmond, supra note 2, at 18; Gray, supra note 2, at 44.
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to work for the federal government. 88 In 1951, he returned to Montgomery, and started his own law practice. 89
Durr was the Civil Rights Movement’s first white lawyer in
Alabama. 90 In 1955, Durr joined forces with Fred Gray, first in a civil
suit representing parents of a young Black boy killed by a speeding
white driver. 91 He also worked with Gray in representing Claudette
Colvin, a Black teenager arrested for refusing to give up her bus seat
when the driver demanded that she do so. 92 Finally, on December 1,
1955, since Fred Gray was out of town at the time, Clifford Durr provided the first legal advice to Rosa Parks after her arrest for refusing
to give up her bus seat. 93 Durr worked behind the scenes with Gray on
legal matters related to the Montgomery Bus Boycott. 94 While Durr
insisted that he played only a small part in Browder v. Gayle, the case
challenging the constitutionality of the bus segregation laws, Fred Gray
attributed to him the idea of bringing the case. 95
Gray and Durr also worked together on NAACP v. Alabama, involving the state shutting down the NAACP when it refused to supply

88.

Salmond, supra note 2, at 33–34, 37, 46; Gray, supra note 2, at 44. Durr
resigned from the Federal Communications Commission because he refused
to sign an anticommunist loyalty oath. Burns, supra note 31, at 95.

89.

Salmond, supra note 2, at 121–22, 155–56; Gray, supra note 2, at 44.

90.

Rubinowitz, supra note 2, at 510–11. See also Gray, supra note 2, at 55
(noting that Durr and only one or two others would take civil rights cases).

91.

Salmond, supra note 2, at 171. This set Durr apart because he both represented a Black client in a suit against a white man, and because he partnered
with a Black lawyer to do it. Both of those arrangements were unheard of in
Montgomery. Id. See infra Section II.D (discussing the social costs faced by
Civil Rights lawyers).

92.

Salmond, supra note 2, at 173; Gray, supra note 2, at 43–44.

93.

Sarah Hart Brown, Standing Against Dragons: Three Southern
Lawyers in an Era of Fear 148 (1998); Burns, supra note 31, at 9, 86
(Stewart Burns ed., 1997); Gray, supra note 2, at 50.

94.

Gray, supra note 2, at 70. While Fred Gray represented Rosa Parks, Durr
helped him, but he was not of record in the case. Virginia Durr, Outside
the Magic Circle: The Autobiography of Virginia Foster Durr
181 (1985).

95.

Brown, supra note 93, at 149. Gray said that Durr’s help was invaluable in
developing the legal strategy and in preparing the necessary documents for
the case. Durr received no fee for his services. Id.; see also Branch, supra
note 7, at 122–23, 129; Salmond, supra note 2, at 171–79; Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956). See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing the Montgomery
Bus Boycott).
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its membership lists, and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the landmark Tuskegee racial gerrymandering case. 96 Gray characterized Durr as a “silent
partner” and adviser on those cases. 97 Like Arthur Shores, Durr was a
very important mentor to Fred Gray, who said that Durr “served as
my adviser . . . during the formative years of my career.” 98 As with
Shores, Fred Gray identified Durr as one of four people who affected
his professional life in significant ways. 99
D. Robert Carter

Robert L. Carter graduated from Howard Law School in 1940 and
earned an LL.M. from Columbia Law School in 1941. 100 He served in
the Army from 1941 to 1944, where he first experienced harsh racism
and became determined to end racial discrimination. 101 After leaving
the Army, Carter joined the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) in
1944 as Thurgood Marshall’s legal assistant, and then became an
assistant special counsel the following year. 102 He played a critical role
in the long series of school desegregation cases, including working as a
lead attorney in Sweatt v. Painter 103 and Brown v. Board of
Education. 104
Robert Carter was the first northern lawyer to work closely with
Fred Gray. When Gray contacted Thurgood Marshall early in the
96.

Brown, supra note 93, at 263; NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See supra Section
I.A.2–3 (analyzing these two cases).

97.

Brown, supra note 93, at 263.

98.

Gray, supra note 2, at 348. Durr was also “the white lawyer upon whom I
depended most for advice.” Id. at 17.

99.

Gray, supra note 2, at 44. Gray spoke of “the close working relationship
that existed between the two of us and how he assisted me in developing,
not only into a good lawyer, but a good Civil Rights lawyer.” Brown, supra
note 93, at 263.

100. Black History Month Spotlight: Robert L. Carter, NAACP LDF (Feb. 5,
2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/black-history-month-spotlightrobert-l-carter [https://perma.cc/28BZ-LH4M] [hereinafter Carter Spotlight].
101. Robert L. Carter, A Matter of Law: A Memoir of Struggle in
the Cause of Equal Rights 36, 49–50 (2005).
102. Roy Reed, Robert L. Carter, 94, Leading Strategist Against Segregation and
U.S. Judge, Dies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2012, at A17; Carter Spotlight, supra
note 100.
103. 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (holding the University of Texas’s refusal to admit a
Black student to its law school because of his race unconstitutional, where a
separate facility provided for Blacks was inferior in tangible and intangible
respects).
104. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Carter Spotlight, supra note
100; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 166, 180, 422–23.
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Montgomery Bus Boycott seeking assistance from the experienced civil
rights lawyers at LDF, Marshall assigned Carter to the task. 105 Fred
Gray travelled to New York before filing Browder v. Gayle, to discuss
the case with both Carter and Thurgood Marshall. 106
Carter later asked Gray for assistance on Alabama v. NAACP. 107 In
turn, Gray asked Carter for help again in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the
Tuskegee voting rights case. 108 The two lawyers argued the case together before the Supreme Court. 109
In 1956, Marshall completed a full separation of LDF and the
NAACP, and made Robert Carter the NAACP’s general counsel.110
During his tenure as a civil rights attorney, Carter argued twenty-two
cases before the Supreme Court, winning twenty-one of them. 111 Carter
left the NAACP in 1968. 112 In 1972, President Nixon appointed him to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, where
he served until retiring in 2009 as a senior judge. 113

105. See Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936–1961, at 302 (1996); Coleman, Nee
& Rubinowitz, supra note 31, at 682.
106. Gray, supra note 2, at 70, 72. See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing the
Montgomery Bus Boycott). Carter assisted Gray in Gayle v. Browder, and
“generally gave advice throughout the movement.” Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956); Gray, supra note 2, at 73.
107. Gray, supra note 2, at 105. See supra Section I.A.2 (discussing NAACP v.
Alabama). It was of great pride to Gray that he was able to assist in keeping
the NAACP active in Alabama, as the organization had been helpful in so
many of his cases. Gray, supra note 2, at 108; NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
108. Gray, supra note 2, at 115; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See
supra Section I.A.3 (discussing Gomillion v. Lightfoot). Carter originally
expressed doubt that this was a winnable case, but after agreeing to look
over a draft of the complaint, he agreed to join forces on the case. Gray,
supra note 2, at 114–15.
109. Gray, supra note 2, at 117–18.
110. Constance Baker Motley, Equal Justice Under Law: An Autobiography 150 (1998); Tushnet, supra note 105, at 310.
111. Carter Spotlight, supra note 100.
112. Carter, supra note 100, at 202. He began a yearlong fellowship at Columbia
University, after which he became a partner at a small New York City law
firm. Id. at 204, 207.
113. Carter died in 2012, at age 94. Dennis McLellan, Robert L. Carter, 1917–
2012; NAACP Attorney Fought Segregation, L.A. Times (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/06/local/la-me-robert-carter-20120106
[https://perma.cc/2H47-9HED]; Carter Spotlight, supra note 100.
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E. Constance Baker Motley

Constance Baker Motley interned with Thurgood Marshall at the
fledgling NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund while she attended Columbia Law School. 114 She volunteered at LDF between the
spring and summer of 1945, and worked there as law clerk from October
1945 until she graduated in June 1946. 115 She then became the first
female staff attorney at LDF. 116
Constance Baker Motley was a staff lawyer at LDF for two decades,
and was eventually promoted to associate counsel. 117 She was the only
female lawyer there for most of that time. 118 Motley worked with Fred
Gray on a number of school desegregation cases, including the suit to
integrate the University of Alabama, Lee v. Macon County Board of
Education, and a suit to integrate Auburn University. 119
In her time at LDF, Motley argued ten cases before the Supreme
Court, winning nine of them. 120 One of her victories involved helping
James Meredith gain admission to the University of Mississippi in 1962
as its first Black student. 121 Motley had a distinguished career after her
time at LDF as well. In 1964, she became the first Black woman elected
to the New York State Senate. 122 In 1965, she was the first woman

114. Motley, supra note 110, at 58–59.
115. Id.
116. See VRA at 50: Day 17, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/vra-at-50day-17 [https://perma.cc/8U8T-2LNV] (last visited Mar. 15, 2017); Greenberg, supra note 2, at 32–36; Motley, supra note 110, at 151–55.
117. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 33–34. Thurgood Marshall left the organization
in the hands of Jack Greenberg, even though Motley had more experience.
Motley, supra note 110, at 151. Motley believed that Marshall skipped over
her because she was a woman. Id.
118. See Constance Baker Motley, My Personal Debt to Thurgood Marshall, 101
Yale L.J. 19 (1991) (“My tribute acknowledges my personal debt to
Thurgood Marshall for aiding my career at a time when nobody was hiring
women lawyers.”); Dorothy Roberts, Constance Baker Motley, in The Yale
Biographical Dictionary of American Law 394 (Roger K. Newman
ed., 2009) (“Upon graduating in 1946, Motley was hired as the only woman
on the LDF legal team . . .”). See generally Greenberg, supra note 2, at
33–36 (discussing Motley and her colleagues on LDF legal team); Motley,
supra note 110, at 151–55 (same).
119. Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Lee v. Macon Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 267
F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp. 724 (M.D.
Ala. 1963). See supra Section I.A.6 (discussing the school desegregation cases).
120. Motley, supra note 110, at 193–202.
121. Id. at 162–83; Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10 (1962).
122. Linn Washington, Black Judges on Justice 127 (1994).
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elected to the Manhattan (New York) Borough presidency. 123 In 1966,
President Johnson appointed her as a federal district court judge. 124 She
was the first Black woman appointed to the federal bench. 125 In 1982,
she became the first woman to serve as chief judge of the Southern
District of New York, “the largest federal trial bench” in the United
States. 126
These five lawyers demonstrated great skill, commitment, and “professional courage” in their careers. They accomplished path-breaking
changes in civil rights law. However, the focus here is on still another
dimension—the personal challenges they faced and the courage they
demonstrated in the process.

II. The Challenges and the Courage
Like the activists they represented, these lawyers required great
courage to deal with the many challenges they faced. The most obvious
and the most serious ones were physical dangers that they and their
families endured. They also had to respond to legal and administrative
strategies officials used in an effort to eliminate lawyers from the Civil
Rights Movement. Economic risks presented still another obstacle for
civil rights lawyers. Moreover, the social tolls they experienced involved
ostracism by family, friends, and others in their communities, as well
as enforced social isolation. Finally, adversaries’ efforts to undermine
the lawyers resulted in psychological burdens, including stress, anxiety,
and fear, for both the lawyers and their families.
A. Physical Dangers

The physical attacks and threats involved both persons and property. For the lawyers most targeted, there could be no real safe haven.
They could not count on being out of danger anywhere. Risks accompanied them to other towns, on the road, motels, the courthouse, their
offices, the kids’ schools and routes back and forth, and even their homes. In some cases, the attacks escalated in seriousness over time, increasing the dangers and harms to the lawyers and their families.

123. Douglas Martin, Constance Baker Motley, Civil Rights Trailblazer, Dies at
84, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2005, at B10.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Motley, supra note 110, at 225; Rachel Christmas Derrick, A Columbian
Ahead of Her Time: Constance Baker Motley, Columbia Mag., Spring
2005, at 21. She died in 2005 at the age of eighty-four. Martin, supra note 123.
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Fred Gray characterized the period of the modern Civil Rights
Movement as “a time when it was very hostile and dangerous” to practice civil rights law. 127 As early as the Montgomery Bus Boycott, racists
used violence to attempt to undermine and defeat the movement.128
Bombs struck a number of places, including Dr. King’s home. 129 While
Fred Gray received bomb threats, he managed to prevent them from
being carried out. 130 His brothers and friends set up a round-the-clock
guard to protect against bombings. 131 Still, he received threatening
phone calls and hate letters. 132 He also survived an attempted stabbing. 133
During the bus boycott, Gray went to Selma, fifty miles away, to
represent a client on an unrelated matter in court. 134 Since it was dangerous for a Black person to travel there alone, he took a friend with
him. 135 While Fred Gray was in court, the police arrested his companion
and gave him a message for Gray. 136 Four police officials told him to
tell Fred Gray to “get out of Selma, . . . by sundown and never be
caught there again.” 137 “Sundown” was both a literal time and a metaphor that has often been used to tell Black people that they are not
wanted, and therefore not safe, in a particular place. 138 Overstaying the
127. Gray, supra note 2, at 376.
128. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The
Montgomery Story 151 (1st Perennial Library ed. 1964) (discussing
bombings in response to the Civil Rights movement); Garrow, supra note
45, at 83 (describing sniper attacks on Black bus riders); Branch, supra note
7, at 197–201 (1988) (discussing the use of violence against Civil Rights
activists).
129. Garrow, supra note 45, at 60; Branch, supra note 7, at 164.
130. Gray, supra note 2, at 77.
131. Pearl Gray Daniels, Portrait of Fred D. Gray: Minister, Civil
Rights Lawyer and Alabama Representative 66 (1975).
132. Gray, supra note 2, at 77. Gray was not aware of these threatening phone
calls, as his family members specifically did not inform him of any calls they
received on his behalf. Daniels, supra note 131, at 66–67.
133. Gray, supra note 2, at 77.
134. Id. at 97–105.
135. Id. at 97.
136. Id. at 98–100.
137. The four officials included the police captain. Id. at 100. The police also said
to “[t]ell all the niggers in Montgomery to stay over there, they don’t have
no business at all in Selma, get out and stay out, if you don’t the nigger
undertakers are going to have a lot of business.” They were not going to
permit the kind of “mess” in Selma that was going on in Montgomery with
the bus boycott. Id. at 100–01.
138. See generally James W. Loewen, Sundown Towns: A Hidden
Dimension of American Racism (2005) (discussing the violent realities of
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time they were permitted in town risked white people resisting their
continued presence, up to and including killing them. 139
Arthur Shores was also exposed to serious danger when he was on
the road. 140 His cases sometimes took him to other parts of the state. In
one incident, he won a case in a rural community and got into his car
to drive back to Birmingham. 141 White men chased him, shouting obscenities. 142 Shores outdrove them, negotiating the country roads as fast
as he could. 143
Early in his career, in 1939, Shores represented a Black prisoner in
a case against a police officer for brutality. 144 Surprisingly, Shores won
and the policeman was suspended for thirty days. 145 Afterwards, a Black
police informant approached Shores and tried to punch him in the
face. 146 Shores dodged the blow, and his friends and family members
rescued him. 147 It turned out that the attacker had been paid to cause
a disturbance. 148 The Ku Klux Klan had threatened Shores at the start

“Sundown Towns”). It was a way of saying that the town of Selma was white
people’s property. Blacks came into the town only at the sufferance of the
whites in power.
139. Whites were entitled to defend their property, a perversion of a traditional
criminal law defense. See generally Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry,
Crimes without Punishment: White Neighbors’ Resistance to Black Entry,
92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 335 (2002) (reviewing Stephen Grant
Meyer, As Long As They Don’t Move Next Door: Segregation and
Racial Conflict in American Neighborhoods (2000)).
140. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 92.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. He always drove a fast car after that, for safety. He also carried a loaded
gun in the glove compartment. It is not known exactly when this incident
occurred, except that it must have been early in Shores’s career, as his
daughter remembers him telling the story during her childhood. See id.
144. Id. at 84–85; Shores, supra note 4, at 269.
145. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 85; Lynda Dempsey Cochran, Arthur Davis
Shores: Advocate for Freedom 39 (Aug. 1977) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Georgia Southern College), http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd
_legacy/210/ [https://perma.cc/6BQU-WDKX]; Shores, supra note 4, at 269.
146. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 85; Cochran, supra note 145, at 39; Shores,
supra note 4, at 270.
147. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 85; Cochran, supra note 145, at 39; Shores,
supra note 4, at 270.
148. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 86; Cochran, supra note 145, at 42; Shores,
supra note 4, at 270.
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of the case, and his victory made him and his family an even greater
target for the KKK. 149
In 1953, the Shores family moved to Smithfield, a middle-class
Black neighborhood that was known as “Dynamite Hill.” 150 It was one
of the most dangerous neighborhoods in a city that itself had so many
bombings in mid-century that it came to be known as “Bombingham.” 151 The Shores family’s move to Dynamite Hill coincided with an
escalation in violence that would continue over the next decade, eventually to the point of multiple bombings. 152
Very soon after they moved to their new house, the drive-by shootings began. 153 Racists fired so many bullets through the Shores’s front
windows that Arthur Shores had a contractor on retainer to repair
them. 154 When Shores called the police about the shootings, the police
officer who came to the house treated it as a trivial matter that did not

149. See id. at 269 (describing warnings sent from the Ku Klux Klan “ordering
me to drop the case or suffer the consequence”); Lee & Shores, supra note
1, at 84 (describing how Shore’s successes made him a target of the Ku Klux
Klan).
150. Id. at 18. The title of the book suggests the ongoing danger that the family
faced. Diane McWhorter, Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama:
The Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights Revolution 75 (1st
Touchstone ed. 2002); Garrow, supra note 45, at 232.
U.W. Clemon, an Alabama Civil Rights lawyer and the state’s first Black
federal judge, said that the book “reveals, ever so poignantly, the tolls that
those victories [landmark civil rights cases] often exacted on him and his
family.” U.W. Clemon, Praise for Lee & Shores, supra note 1. Wayne Flynt,
Distinguished University Professor of History Emeritus, Auburn University,
referred to Shores’s “incredible personal courage.” Wayne Flynt, Praise for
Lee & Shores, supra note 1.
151. McWhorter, supra note 150, at 72; Garrow, supra note 45, at 232. There
were more than fifty unsolved racial bombings in Birmingham from 1947–
63. Eskew, supra note 22, at 322.
152. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 18–19, 33, 38–39; Thornton, supra note
22, at 337.
153. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 18. Helen Shores Lee recounted: “I can still
recall the pinging sound bullets made when someone in a passing car shot
the window in our recreation room. The thick glass usually prevented the
window from shattering, but the bullets would pierce through and lodge in our
interior walls. Each bullet made its mark—a small hole through the glass—
and each bullet brought our mother fresh new fear.” Id. at 15.
154. Id. at 176. Shores gave the “family drill”: “When someone fires into the
house, immediately hit the floor, put your head down, and crawl quickly to
a safe place.” Id. at 18.
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warrant any investigation by law enforcement. 155 It was clear that the
police would provide no protection against those attacks. 156
Aside from shootings, the family faced threats and harassment in
the neighborhood as well. One night in 1953, a carful of angry white
youths drove back and forth past the Shores house shouting racial epithets as the family sat out on the front porch. 157 After the second pass,
Shores’s daughter Helen got so angry that she went inside, got a gun,
and attempted to shoot at the youths as they made their third pass.158
Her father hit her arm, so the bullet went up in the air rather than
possibly hitting one of the young men. 159 He told her that if she had hit
someone, she would have gone to jail, possibly for the rest of her life.160
In addition to not feeling safe within their home, the children faced
danger at school as well. One day a white man showed up at Shores’s
daughter Barbara’s school and told her teacher that Mr. Shores wanted
his daughter home right away. 161 He said that he had come to take her
home. 162 The teacher had the presence of mind to call Mr. Shores, who
said that the man was lying. 163 Meanwhile, the man ran out of the
building, into his van, and drove off. 164 There is no way of knowing
what Shores’s daughter’s fate would have been if the kidnapping had
succeeded. 165
By 1963, Shores was not as active in civil rights cases as he had
been in previous decades. 166 To some extent, he had moved on to more
lucrative corporate work, and younger Black attorneys had taken over

155. Id. at 18–19.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 20–21.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id. See infra Section II.E (discussing the psychological burdens of racially
targeted violence).
160. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 21–22; see infra Section II.E.
161. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 148. It is unclear exactly what year this
attempted kidnapping occurred, but judging by Barbara being school age, it
had to be in the 1950s or very early ’60s. See id. at 90.
162. Id. at 148.
163. Id.
164. Id. There is no indication that Shores reported the incident to the police.
Doing so would have been an exercise in futility and potentially even
dangerous.
165. Id. at 148. Her parents did not talk much about the incident, apparently to
avoid adding to their fear, but security measures got tighter in response to
it. Id.
166. Id. at 41.
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some of the civil rights litigation load. 167 Shores assumed that this
meant the Ku Klux Klan would no longer target him. 168 That assumption proved to be very wrong. On August 20, 1963, attackers set off
dynamite that caused more than $7,200 damage to the Shores’s $40,000
home. 169 The front of the house was demolished, the garage doors were
blown open, and the car inside was crushed. 170 No one was hurt, but
the blast was so powerful that shards of glass from the windows in one
room stuck in the walls. If anyone had been in that room at the time
of the blast, they almost certainly would have been killed. 171
Shores repaired and reinforced the house. 172 He assumed that the
racists had sent their message and there would be no further bombings. 173 Once again, he underestimated his adversary, which was probably the Ku Klux Klan. The KKK was particularly active and violent
in Birmingham at the time. 174 Two weeks after the first blast, another
bomb hit the Shores home, while it was still under repair from the first
blast. 175 It did less than $1,200 additional damage. 176 But this time it
caused a concussion. 177 Arthur Shores’s wife Theodora was knocked out
of bed by the tremor. 178
167. Cochran, supra note 145, at 103.
168. Id. at 104.
169. Thornton, supra note 22, at 337.
170. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 33. This was one of the rare occasions when
Arthur Shores showed a reaction. Barbara indicated that he was visibly
shaken and perhaps scared. Id. See infra Section II.E.
171. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 38–39. See also Cochran, supra note 145,
at 104.
Klan member Robert Chambliss was known as “Dynamite Bob.” When he
heard about the bombing, he said that he hoped that it had killed Arthur
Shores. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 35. While the family received many
supportive letters after the bombing, other writers expressed regret that
Shores had survived it. Id. at 36–38.
172. Id. at 41.
173. Id. at 39.
174. See Keith S. Hebert, Ku Klux Klan in Contemporary America, The
Encyclopedia of Ala. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.encyclopediaofalabama
.org/article/h-3291 [https://perma.cc/A2P6-CBY8].
175. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 44; Thornton, supra note 22, at 342.
Earlier that day, a federal court had ordered the admission of the first five
Black students to three previously all-white public schools. Branch, supra
note 7, at 888. That might explain the timing of the blast.
176. Thornton, supra note 22, at 342.
177. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 45.
178. Id.
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FBI investigators later told Shores that his long record of civil
rights litigation had made him a continuing symbol among whites as a
prominent and hated agitator for racial change. 179 In response to the
attack, armed guards volunteered to guard the Shores house at night
to prevent further bombings. 180 Attorney Constance Baker Motley described the scene that she saw when she and Thurgood Marshall arrived
to stay as guests at “Arthur Shores’s spacious new home on the city’s
outskirts” while they were litigating a case in Birmingham: “When
Thurgood and I arrived, the garage door was wide open. Inside were six
or eight black men with shotguns and machine guns who had been
guarding the house since the last bombing.” 181
On Sunday, March 21, 1965, voting rights activists began their
famous march from Selma, Alabama, to the state capitol in Montgomery. 182 Meanwhile, in Birmingham, there was yet another attempt
to bomb the Shores home. This time it was part of a coordinated attack.
Several green boxes appeared at Black sites that morning, including a
church, a funeral home, a high school, and the Shores property. 183 The
boxes were loaded with dynamite. 184 Fortunately, demolition experts
from a nearby army base arrived in time to disable them before they
were timed to explode. 185 They disabled the bomb at the Shores home

179. Cochran, supra note 145, at 107. Even though Shores was more conservative
than some other Black leaders, white supremacists targeted him because of
his long history of successful federal cases challenging racial discrimination.
Thornton, supra note 22, at 337.
180. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 145.
181. Motley, supra note 110, at 123. See infra Section II.E.
Thurgood Marshall stayed at the Shores house on occasion, including during
the Autherine Lucy trial challenging her exclusion from the University of
Alabama because of her race. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 145. Even
though this was before any bombings, the threats of violence were so great
during that period that men from the area organized a “neighborhood watch,”
armed with shotguns and they patrolled the area from 5:00 P.M. to 8:00
A.M. Id. at 145.
182. Selma to Montgomery March (1965), King Online Encyclopedia, http:
//kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_selma_to
_montgomery_march/index.html [https://perma.cc/7N9J-CRLD] (last
visited Dec. 8, 2016).
183. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 222–23; Cochran, supra note 145, at 102–03.
184. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 222–23.
185. Id.
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only a minute before noon, when it was set to go off. 186 An expert estimated that there was enough dynamite in the bombs to destroy most
of the neighborhood. 187
Finally, like Fred Gray, Arthur Shores received telephone death
threats both at home and at his office. 188 He changed his home number
regularly to minimize those calls. 189 He kept guns in the house and
carried a gun whenever he went out, as did his guards. 190 He once explicitly called the bluff of someone threatening him. 191 Shores responded
to all of these threats by not backing down, just like his fellow civil
rights attorneys who dealt with similar dangers. Shores refused to leave
Birmingham or walk away from his civil rights work. 192
The white Montgomery lawyer Clifford Durr also faced physical
dangers. He received death threats for defending a Black man who was
accused of propositioning a white woman. 193 In another incident, Durr
loaned his car to a white friend to go to a rally for Freedom Riders at
a Black church. 194 Extreme segregationists attacked the car after they
saw white people getting out of it outside the church where a rally was
taking place. 195 They turned the car over and put a lit match in the gas
tank to set it on fire. 196 There was nothing left but the frame of the
car. 197
186. Id. at 223.
187. Id.; Cochran, supra note 145, at 103.
188. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 118.
189. Id. at 19.
190. Id. at 17, 145; Motley, supra note 110, at 123; Cochran, supra note 145, at
107.
191. He told a threatening phone caller exactly when he would be leaving his
office and what his route would be. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 149.
Nothing happened. Id.
192. Id. at 146. Shores and his wife argued about whether to stay in Birmingham,
to the point that their daughter worried that they might be getting a divorce.
Id. Over time, Theodora became a supporter of her husband and his work,
leaving it all in God’s hands. Id.
193. Salmond, supra note 2, at 184–85.
Robert Carter also received many threats as he litigated, often related to
school desegregation cases. Carter, supra note 101, at 133–34.
194. Durr, supra note 94, at 300.
195. Id. They did not take Durr’s advice to park the car a few blocks away from
the church and enter through the back. Id. See also Brown, supra note 93,
at 187 (“Unfortunately, Mitford parked the Durrs’ car near the church, and
the crowd overturned and burned it during the disturbance.”).
196. Durr, supra note 94, at 301; Brown, supra note 93, at 187.
197. Garrow, supra note 45, at 158. Durr, supra note 94, at 301. After that,
they could not get insurance in Montgomery because their insurance company
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The northern lawyers who worked with Fred Gray also faced danger
whenever they went South. Segregationists viewed them as “outside
agitators” threatening the racial status quo, like the “carpetbaggers” of
the 19th century Reconstruction era. 198 When Constance Baker Motley
represented Autherine Lucy in her challenge to the all-white University
of Alabama, there were great risks for client and lawyers alike.199 In
referring to the courage it took, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
remarked that “people put their lives, their health, their families at risk
when they made stands on what were, in that time, in that place, in
those days, very unpopular positions. And [Motley] did. She just did
it.” 200
Northern lawyers like Constance Baker Motley, Robert Carter, and
Thurgood Marshall headed into danger every time they journeyed to
Alabama for cases they were litigating. Even sleeping had risks. Black
lawyers were not allowed to stay in any of the white hotels in Alabama. 201 So they often stayed with a fellow attorney, most often Fred
blamed them for letting the car be burned. They were able to get insurance
in Birmingham. Id.
Shores had similar difficulties insuring his house after two bombings. Lee
& Shores, supra note 1, at 48.
198. See generally Baker, supra note 19, at 69 (discussing Southern attitudes
towards Reconstruction in the 1900s); see also Garrow, supra note 45, at
67 (“[A local pastor] pointedly told reporters that the protest was a local
movement and not for outside agitators.”).
199. See supra Section I.B (discussing Arthur Shores’s involvement in Autherine
Lucy’s suit against the University of Alabama); see generally Clark, supra
note 14 (discussing the school desegregation cases and the underlying danger
to those involved).
200. Justice is a Black Woman: The Life and Work of Constance
Baker Motley (Quinnipiac Univ. 2012) [hereinafter Motley Documentary].
Other judges made similar observations about Constance Baker Motley in
the documentary:
She had extraordinary courage and perseverance, and I think that’s
a lesson that we can learn in this century—that whatever choice you
make, you need to stand up. That was to me the heart of Constance
Baker Motley—that if you see a wrong, that you as a lawyer had
the power to change it.
Judge Ann C. Williams of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
District Judge Laura Taylor Swain said that “she [Motley] gave people great
hope, often at great risk and often at personal danger to herself.” Id.
Juan Williams, the narrator, emphasized that “there was no mistaking the
danger that Motley constantly faced while traveling and working in the
Southern states at the time . . . . threats of verbal and physical abuse haunted
nearly all the public school and university cases the legal defense fund
handled.” Id.
201. Gray, supra note 2, at 218.
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Gray in Montgomery, or Arthur Shores in Birmingham. 202 Alternatively, they could stay at one of the few hotels for Blacks in the South,
the Gaston Motel. 203 However, in 1963, racists bombed the Gaston
Motel in an attempt to kill Martin Luther King, who was staying there
at the time. 204
Finally, and ironically, there were problems with the police. In addition to the extra-legal attacks by the KKK and individual segregationists, the police also posed a danger to the lawyers and their families. 205 Like civil rights activists engaged in peaceful protests, lawyers
and their families had much to fear from the police. In some cases, it
was their inaction. They did not provide protection against attacks,

202. Id. (“Bernice and I entertained many civil rights leaders and attorneys in
our home. Until the mid-1960s, African American attorneys could not stay
in white hotels.”); Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 176.
203. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 334. The Gaston motel was even more rare in
that it was Black-owned and actually resembled white lodging in terms of
comforts and amenities. Id.; McWhorter, supra note 150, at 263 (“[T]he
boxy-modern brick Gaston Motel . . . [gave] Negro visitors a ‘nice place’ to
stay in Birmingham.”).
204. Id. at 429; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 321. The bomb exploded right
under the room where Dr. King was supposed to be staying. Luckily, the
room was empty at the time. The room below it was also destroyed, but the
person staying there miraculously survived. McWhorter, supra note 150,
at 430.
Arthur Shores’s daughter Helen suggested, ironically, that Thurgood
Marshall stayed at their house when he worked with her father because
staying at a hotel was too dangerous. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 96.
In discussing LDF lawyers, Jack Greenberg, Thurgood Marshall’s successor
in heading the organization, said:
LDF lawyers worked in the vortex and at the edges of violence, but
mostly came out unscathed. I can’t think of a single instance of a
lawyer refusing to attend a case or meet with clients because of fear
of violence, though we did our best to minimize risks. Thurgood used
to joke that he had a big yellow stripe down his back. We followed
his example . . . .and he claimed that he “wrapped his rights in
cellophane” and stuck them in his pocket when he went down South.
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 321.
Thurgood Marshall’s wife expressed her fears about the risks he was taking
going South to challenge the Jim Crow regime. See American Experience:
Simple Justice (PBS television broadcast Jan. 18, 1993) (following Thurgood
Marshall's journey from law school at Howard University to the south with
Dean Charles Houston to document the effects of segregation and the
eventual challenge of segregation in court).
205. Thornton, supra note 22, at 311; Garrow, supra note 45, at 74–76;
Branch, supra note 7, at 758–61.
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leaving that to the lawyers and their families and friends. 206 In other
instances, the police joined with private individuals and groups to cause
the harm.
When the Shores house was bombed for the second time, a neighbor
reported that when he heard the blast there was already a police car
parked in his driveway, and police cars had blocked off the street.207
This suggests that, at the very least, the police knew about the planned
bombing and chose to do nothing to prevent it. More likely, they were
co-conspirators in the attack.
Constance Baker Motley also found law enforcement unreliable as
a source of protection. An official of the NAACP commented about her
situation: “We couldn’t count unfortunately on the local police to provide the security that she needed, nor in some instances could we count
on the local members of the FBI because oft-times they were in cahoots
with the local police.” 208
206. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 18–19.
207. Id. at 47.
208. Motley Documentary, supra note 200 (quoting Herbert Wright, Former
Director and Youth Director at the NAACP).
Much of the danger Motley experienced was in Mississippi, rather than
Alabama. Wright pointed out that she was always in danger when she was
in the state representing James Meredith, who was seeking to be the first
Black student to attend the University of Mississippi. Id. Meredith feared,
with good reason, that his life was in danger. Eyes on the Prize: America’s
Civil Rights Years (1954–1965): Interview With Constance Baker Motley,
Wash. U. Digital Gateways (Nov. 2, 1985), http://digital.wustl.edu/e/
eop/eopweb/mot0015.0589.074judgeconstancebakermotley.html [https://
perma.cc/XH8X-Y4P7]. When Motley, his lawyer, appeared in public with
him, she was potentially in harm’s way, as well.
Also, in her autobiography, Motley described an incident when she was
traveling with Medgar Evers, Mississippi NAACP leader:
As we were driving outside of Jackson onto a stretch of road through
a wooded area, Medgar kept checking the rearview mirror. I was still
working on the motion papers. Suddenly, Medgar said, “Don’t look
back. Put that yellow pad in The New York Times. We are being
followed by the state police.” Medgar, attempting to calm me, explained that he had been followed on many occasions as he crisscrossed the state in connection with his NAACP duties . . . .I rode
from that point on to Meridian, another twenty-five miles or so
away, with my head straight forward and scarcely breathing.
Motley, supra note 110, at 180.
Medgar Evers’s assassination in 1963 was extremely traumatic for Motley.
See Motley Documentary, supra note 200 (“The mental anguish was so great
I did not think I would ever get out of bed again. I resolved then and there
not to go to the funeral in Jackson, reasoning that it was time to give up on
Mississippi. I felt I would not be safe there.”).
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While not in Alabama, Thurgood Marshall had a near death experience at the hands of the police. In 1946, having secured the acquittal
of several Black defendants in a Tennessee courtroom, white racists and
local police joined forces in a plot to lynch him. 209 The police arrested
him on a bogus charge and took him to a river bank where a lynch mob
waited with a rope over a tree. 210 Marshall’s co-counsel helped thwart
the scheme and helped Marshall get out of town by using a decoy car
as a deception. 211
So, Fred Gray and his colleagues faced very significant risks to their
own and their families’ lives and property. However, those extra-legal,
violent strategies did not succeed in stopping those courageous lawyers.
Nor did the other challenges with which their adversaries presented
them.
B. Legal Threats

Officials sometimes turned to the legal system in an effort to remove
civil rights lawyers from the movement, especially in the case of Fred
Gray. In her Foreword to the 1995 edition of Fred Gray’s Bus Ride to
Justice, Professor Darlene Clark Hine suggested that:
Though Gray largely operated behind the scenes, the white
governing officials nevertheless knew with whom they were dealing. Ex-Alabama governor and extreme segregationist John
Patterson confided in an interview decades later that if any of the
state-sanctioned maneuvers to remove Fred Gray from the city
had worked then, the movement for desegregation perhaps could
have been stalled or put on hold for a generation or more. 212

John Patterson served as Alabama Attorney General from 1955 to
1959 and as governor of the state from 1959 to 1963.213 In both offices,
he led the effort to defeat the Civil Rights Movement in the state. 214 As
a lawyer, he turned to legal strategies to pursue that objective by trying

209. Williams, supra note 83, at 139–41; see also Gilbert King, Devil in the
Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn
of a New America 13–20 (2012) (noting that white racists continually
threatened to lynch Thurgood Marshall throughout his time in Tennessee).
210. Williams, supra note 83, at 140.
211. Id. at 141.
212. Hine, supra note 2, at xiii.
213. Howard, supra note 37, 48–65, 140–49. See Carl Grafton & Anne Permaloff,
John. M. Patterson (1959–63), Encyclopedia of Ala. (Jan. 15, 2008),
http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1431 [https://perma.cc/
L7MG-NTPE] (last updated Sept. 30, 2014).
214. Rubinowitz, supra note 3, (manuscript at 3–7).
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to remove key civil rights actors from the scene. 215 While it is not clear
how much Patterson was involved in the legal strategies designed to
remove Fred Gray, he certainly had a direct hand in working against
the Civil Rights Movement.
Alabama officials, possibly including Patterson, aggressively used
legal and administrative strategies to attempt to remove Fred Gray
from the movement. The two main approaches were charging him with
barratry—both as a criminal prosecution and an attempted
disbarment—and attempting to remove Gray’s ministerial exemption
and draft him into military service. 216
In 1956, during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Fred Gray faced his
first attacks from the state. In an effort to remove Gray from the
movement, Alabama officials drew on a tactic that had been successful
a decade earlier. In that 1945 incident, Arthur H. Madison, a Black
Alabama-born lawyer, lost his license because of his civil rights activities. 217 On a visit to his home state from New York, he attempted to
help Black citizens register to vote. 218 As a result, he was arrested under
a state misdemeanor barratry statute, which prohibited lawyers from
representing individuals without their consent. 219 Madison appealed the
denial of the right to vote of eight Blacks; but “five [of the eight Blacks]
made affidavits that they had not employed Madison or authorized him
to take the appeals.” 220 As a result, Madison was disbarred, left the
state, and returned to his law practice in New York. 221 Officials had
accomplished their purpose of removing a key lawyer from challenging
the racial status quo.
215. Id. (manuscript at 7–20).
216. Officials’ efforts to remove Gray from the scene are a sign that they viewed
him as a key player in sustaining the bus boycott.
217. J. Clay Smith, Jr., Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer, 1844–1944, at 275 (1993); Gray, supra note 2, at 333; Thornton,
supra note 22, at 28, 31, 85, 436, 589 n.15.
Madison had earlier moved to New York, where he had established a lucrative
practice. Cochran, supra note 145, at 29–30.
218. Cochran, supra note 145, at 30.
219. Smith, supra note 217, at 275.
220. Id. As with Fred Gray, it is likely that whites’ pressure led those five to sign
the affidavits. In this case, they were apparently threatened with being fired
from their teaching jobs unless they signed affidavits that they had not
retained Madison to represent them. Cochran, supra note 145, at 30.
Arthur Shores represented Madison in his appeal. Id. at 31.
221. Smith, supra note 217, at 275. He had challenged unsuccessfully the constitutionality of Alabama’s registration law. Alabama Senator Lister Hill was
determined to terminate Madison’s efforts to register Blacks and pressured
effectively for his disbarment. Id.
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When Fred Gray filed Browder v. Gayle in federal court, challenging Alabama’s state and local bus segregation laws, state officials deployed the tactic again. Gray represented a half dozen women who
served as plaintiffs in the case. 222 One of those plaintiffs, Jeanetta Reese,
was an employee of a high ranking Montgomery police official. 223 After
being interrogated by her employer and other officials, as well as receiving intimidating phone calls and harassment for being a plaintiff in
the lawsuit, Mrs. Reese disavowed any knowledge of the lawsuit and
any agreement to serve as a plaintiff in it. 224 Opponents of the boycott
had pressured her to the point that she thought she would be killed if
she did not recant. 225
Local officials used Mrs. Reese’s statements as the basis for indicting Fred Gray under Alabama’s barratry statute. 226 The state claimed
that Gray was representing Mrs. Reese without her permission, which
is a misdemeanor. 227 More importantly, a conviction would also be
grounds for automatic disbarment. 228

222. Gray, supra note 2, at 75–96, 333–34; Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956).
223. Gray, supra note 2, at 81.
224. Id.; Bayard Rustin, Montgomery Diaries (Feb. 22, 1956), in Daybreak of
Freedom: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, supra note 31, at 166;
Donald T. Ferron, Report on MIA Mass Meeting (Feb. 1956), in Daybreak
of Freedom: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, supra note 31, at 175.
225. Rustin, supra note 224, at 166; Branch, supra note 7, at 167, 177.
226. Gray, supra note 2, at 81. Barratry is the practice of stirring up litigation
in an attempt to harass. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s
Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 Yale L.J.
999, 1028 n.181 (1989) (“Gray was accused of including a woman as a
plaintiff in a lawsuit without her authorization.”); Lee & Shores, supra
note 1, at 112. David Garrow referred to the case against Fred Gray as a
“trumped up charge.” Garrow, supra note 45, at 63–64.
During this period, many southern states passed increasingly stringent
barratry laws. They attempted to keep organizations like the NAACP and
LDF from soliciting clients to facilitate litigation challenging the Jim Crow
regime. As a result, a number of Civil Rights lawyers faced the threat of
disbarment in southern states. See Carter, supra note 101, 147–48 (2005)
(discussing how lawyers employing the NAACP’s method of finding clients
were operating under the threat of disbarment).
227. Gray, supra note 2, at 81; Branch, supra note 7, at 167.
228. See Gray, supra note 2, at 81 (“The state statute under which I was indicted
called for automatic disbarment upon conviction.”); see also Entin, supra
note 5, at 257 (“[A] county grand jury indicted him [Gray] for barratry—
maliciously stirring up lawsuits—an offence for which he could have been
disbarred.”).
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Ultimately, the state indictment was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Browder case was in federal court. 229 Although it was
not necessary to make the showing, Fred Gray demonstrated that the
charges were frivolous, since he documented his client’s having agreed
to serve as a plaintiff in the case. 230 Partially because Clifford Durr had
alerted him about the barratry ploy, Gray had obtained written proof
of Mrs. Reese retaining him, as well as photos and tape recordings
demonstrating her wish to be included in the lawsuit. 231
Another effort to remove Gray also began in the immediate aftermath of his filing Browder v. Gayle, when Fred Gray’s local draft board
took action. 232 Gray had been a boy preacher and served as a pastor in
a local church while he practiced law in Montgomery. 233 The Selective
Service statute provided an exemption from the draft for ministers, and
Gray had always received such an exemption in the past. 234 However,
229. Gray, supra note 2, at 83.
230. Id. at 81. Clifford Durr had warned Gray to be careful with his plaintiffs,
because officials could put pressure on them to lie about his representing
them, thus enabling authorities to bring barratry charges. Durr indicated
that he was aware of an earlier prosecution that had driven a Black lawyer
from the state, likely referring to the Arthur Madison incident. See Branch,
supra note 7, at 158–59.
Gray tried to keep a low profile during the planning process for what became
the Montgomery Bus Boycott: “I had been a member of the Bar for just a
little over a year, and if my involvement became known, they would probably
accuse me of stirring up litigation. They might have disbarred me before I
could even get started.” Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice: A Conversation
with Fred Gray (Introduction by Jonathan L. Entin), 64 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 733, 745 (2014) [hereinafter Gray Lecture]. Gray also took precautions
in his work because he anticipated the possibility of such a problem: “When
we started the bus boycott, I wanted to be very careful to be sure that what
I did was ethically correct. That way, the Bar would have no excuse to bring
any disciplinary action against me.” Id. at 746.
231. Gray, supra note 2, at 81.
232. Id. at 77. Once again, Gray anticipated the challenge:
But I was expecting, at some point along the way, that they might
have my draft board change my classification from a minister’s
classification . . . . Every time the draft board required me to make
a submission of my work, I told them the religious work I was doing.
They were [perfectly] satisfied with it until I filed the lawsuit
challenging segregation and became involved in the bus boycott . . .
would not have minded going into service, except that this reclassification had been for the purpose of stopping my activities with the
Montgomery Bus Boycott.
Gray Lecture, supra note 230, at 746–47.
233. Gray, supra note 2, at 77–78.
234. Id. at 77.
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the local draft board reacted to his role in the bus boycott by revoking
his exemption, making him immediately eligible to be drafted by changing his draft status to I-A, and ordering him to report for induction into
the military. 235 Gray immediately appealed the local board’s decision to
Selective Service headquarters in Washington. 236 Agency head General
Hershey overruled the local draft board and reinstated his exemption
the day before Gray was scheduled to report. 237 Once again, Gray’s
persistence and dedication enabled him to continue to serve the Civil
Rights Movement.
C. Economic Costs

The civil rights lawyers in private practice faced two kinds of economic challenges. 238 For some, civil rights cases risked the loss of paying
clients and posed a great threat to the sustainability of their practice.
Others received offers from their adversaries of economic benefits if they
would forego their participation in the Civil Rights Movement.
Clifford Durr’s experience exemplified the first problem. When he
moved back home to Montgomery in 1951, he faced serious challenges
in building a practice. 239 The obstacles to getting white and Black
clients differed, but both were serious. Durr had great difficulty securing
and retaining white clients because of his reputation as a liberal and

235. Id. at 77–78. Decades later, Gray discovered that the state and county bar
associations had also tried to get him drafted. Id. at 78–80; Branch, supra
note 7, at 168.
236. Gray, supra note 2, at 78; Gray Lecture, supra note 230, at 747.
237. Gray, supra note 2, at 78. It is not clear why he overruled the local draft
board. Fred Gray speculated that Hershey had some connection to Tuskegee,
Alabama, as did Gray. See id. (noting that Gray later discovered Hershey
did have a connection to Tuskegee).
The local board was so angered by the decision that it adopted a policy that
it would not draft anybody until Gray was inducted. Id. They created a new
classification, called F-G and said they would use it to exempt everyone until
Fred Gray was drafted. Id.
238. Gray’s northern colleagues were largely exempt from economic pressures.
Some had staff positions with civil rights organizations like LDF or the
NAACP. See Rubinowitz, supra note 2, at 529–35 (discussing the formation
and functioning of the NAACP and LDF). Others received fees for their
service on specific matters, such as some members of Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s defense team in his 1960 perjury prosecution. See Edgar Dyer, A
“Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin Luther
King, Jr., 88 J. Afr. Am. Hist. 245, 251–52 (2003); Rubinowitz, supra note
3 (discussing the efforts of Martin Luther King Jr.’s defense team during his
perjury trial).
239. Salmond, supra note 2, at 157–58; Durr, supra note 94, at 250–53; Brown,
supra note 93, at 101.
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integrationist and his involvement in civil rights cases. 240 He downplayed his role in the bus boycott for several reasons, not the least of
which was that if his participation became widely known, his fragile
practice could have been ruined. 241 Although he worked behind the
scenes with Fred Gray, white businessmen and professionals came to
know of his sympathies with the boycott. 242 That also cost him business. 243 Even potential clients who respected his stand on civil rights
generally engaged white supremacist lawyers on the assumption that
they would fare better in the segregationist courts. 244
With respect to Black potential clients, Durr faced two kinds of
problems. Relatively affluent Black clients often secured the services of
better known white lawyers or the Black lawyers who set up their practice in the city. 245 That left Durr with poor Black clients who he wished
to serve; but they could not afford standard fees. 246 The minimal fees
he received reflected their financial situation. 247 That made his practice
precarious, at best. The typical small city legal business of matters such
as wills and deeds “dried up.” 248 As a result, he faced major problems
in trying to maintain his practice. In November 1964, Durr closed his
law office. 249
Fred Gray and Arthur Shores faced economic pressures as well; but
they came in a different form. When Gray returned to Montgomery
after law school, he opened up an office. 250 In the year before the bus
boycott, Gray had a great challenge in obtaining clients and building a
240. Brown, supra note 93, at 182; Salmond, supra note 2, at 176–77, 181.
241. Salmond, supra note 2, at 176. See also Brown, supra note 93, at 149, 263
(Fred Gray discusses Clifford Durr’s role as a “silent partner” in many of his
cases).
242. Salmond, supra note 2, at 175–76; see also supra Section I.C (discussing
Clifford Durr’s involvement).
243. Brown, supra note 93, at 182.
244. See, e.g., id. at 151 (“An old friend . . . declined to hire Cliff for his
Montgomery business because he needed ‘someone who stood better with the
courts’; he ended up employing ‘the town’s best white supremacist lawyer.’”).
Durr said that this kind of incident happened repeatedly. Id.
245. Salmond, supra note 2, at 186.
246. Durr, supra note 94, at 251; Brown, supra note 93, at 182. Those included
cases against police for denying the rights of Blacks, thus pitting Durr against
the local police. Salmond, supra note 2, at 187; Brown, supra note 93, at
183.
247. While he felt a “sense of duty and purpose” working on these matters, they
did not provide the fees or the intellectual stimulation he desired. Id. at 182.
248. Salmond, supra note 2, at 177.
249. Id. at 196; Brown, supra note 93, at 250.
250. Gray, supra note 2, at 28.
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practice. 251 However, once the boycott began, he received offers of business and clients if he would drop out of civil rights work. 252 He was told
he would have all the legal cases he could handle if he agreed not to file
suits challenging segregation laws. 253 Gray played such a key role from
the time of the bus boycott that removing him could have had a very
significant impact on the movement. Gray rejected those offers out of
hand, since accepting them would have been antithetical to his mission
of “destroying everything segregated [he] could find.” 254
Similarly, the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacists tried to
“bribe” Arthur Shores to drop out of certain cases. 255 Since threats did
not work, they tried incentives. 256 He too rejected the efforts to undermine his commitment to the cause. 257
D. Social Costs

The Alabama lawyers and their families experienced two kinds of
social costs—ostracism and enforced isolation. The very few white lawyers had to face widespread ostracism from the white community, including former friends. Fred Gray also encountered some ostracism as
a result of his civil rights work. Similarly, in the early part of his career,
Arthur Shores was ostracized by the white community. 258 His civil rights
work presented an unwelcome challenge to the racial status quo. 259
Also, some family members experienced an enforced isolation because of the physical threats to them. Ostracism and isolation both fell
especially hard on the lawyers’ children.
Social ostracism affected the rare white attorney deeply. Clifford
Durr came from a white family that had been prominent in Montgomery for generations. 260 The title of his wife Virginia’s autobiography,
“Outside the Magic Circle,” captures the ostracism that the Durr family
faced because most whites considered him a traitor to the race. 261
251. Entin, supra note 5, at 255; Gray, supra note 2, at 28–31.
252. Gray, supra note 2, at 73–74.
253. Id. at 74.
254. Id.
255. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 144.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Cochran, supra note 145, at 131.
259. Id.
260. Salmond, supra note 2, at 1–2; Durr, supra note 2, at 159.
261. See generally Salmond, supra note 2, at 170–95 (discussing the effect on
Durr’s social life and career due to his involvement in the movement); Durr,
supra note 2, at 241–337 (explaining the effects of Durr’s career on church
groups, neighbors, families, and the community). One author suggested that
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When Durr agreed to join Fred Gray in representing the Black
plaintiffs in the wrongful death suit against a white person, his actions
set him apart from his family, his white friends, and the white community. 262 He accepted this role notwithstanding the consequences that
were likely to follow. 263 While Durr kept his involvement in the bus
boycott to himself, he made clear his “sympathy for its aims.” 264 That
led to the family’s isolation from the white community. 265 Boycott
movement leader Jo Ann Robinson said that the Durr family became
“martyrs to the boycott” who were scorned by the white community
and socially ostracized. 266
The Durr children suffered especially from the ostracism, as teachers and classmates treated them as children of disloyal parents. 267 Since
the family faced such hard times financially, they depended on friends’
assistance and scholarships to enable them to send their daughters to
out-of-state boarding school so they would not continue to suffer those
hardships. 268
While ostracism hit the white lawyers hard, enforced social isolation
had greater impact on Blacks. Once again, the Shores family had the
worst of it. The routines of everyday life took a back seat to the demands of safety and security. Because of the physical dangers discussed
by 1950, Clifford Durr had made a commitment to live “outside the magic
circle” of southern society, in which he was born. Brown, supra note 93, at
88.
Fred Gray said that Clifford Durr “and his wife endured public scorn and
social ostracism from prominent whites in the city for their sympathetic support and involvement in these [desegregation] lawsuits.” Gray, supra note 2,
at 45.
At the same time, Durr’s mother and other members of the extended family
remained loyal to Clifford, Virginia, and their children, even though they
strongly disagreed with their progressive ideas, especially their stance on race.
Durr, supra note 2, at 241; Brown, supra note 93, at 100.
262. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; Salmond, supra note 2, at 171.
263. Salmond, supra note 2, at 171.
264. Id. at 176; see also Brown, supra note 93, at 149, 263 (describing Durr’s
approach to his activism).
265. Salmond, supra note 2, at 176.
266. Id. Durr later described himself as “a stranger down there among my own
people.” Brown, supra note 93, at 252.
267. Salmond, supra note 2, at 176.
268. Id. at 177. Durr’s nephew, Nesbitt Elmore, was another one of the very few
white lawyers who risked ostracism by supporting civil rights. Gray, supra
note 2, at 200. In 1953, he petitioned the school board for admission of some
Black students who lived near a white school. Id. Gray characterized it as a
very courageous act for a white lawyer in Montgomery. Id. The Elmore
family endured severe criticism and harassment as a result. Id.
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above, the Shores family took protective measures that isolated their
daughters. 269 While the girls preferred to walk home from school with
their friends, their parents took them to school and picked them up
each day. 270 The girls could not give their phone number to friends, due
to the frequent threatening phone calls. 271 Moreover, the girls’ friends
could not visit them freely at their house because of the danger of
bombings or shootings. 272
Thus, the Black and white lawyers and their families faced different
kinds of social burdens. But none could escape the fact that the lawyers’
involvement in civil rights work came at a serious price for their everyday social interactions.
E. Psychological Burdens: Stress, Anxiety, Fear, Grief, and Sadness

Just as the required courage discussed so far was on top of that
required to navigate a racist legal system, the psychological tolls considered here were in addition to those that accompanied the legal work
of challenging that system. There were many signs of anger and fear,
accompanied by feelings of helplessness, anxiety, grief, and sadness that
affected the lawyers and especially their family members.
For the Shores family—especially Arthur Shores’s wife and daughters—the first bombing brought fears that stayed with them through
the years, especially after a second bombing followed within two
weeks. 273 At first, Shores’s wife Theodora was so frightened that she
urged her husband to move the family to Michigan to escape these
dangers. 274 During the periods when guards protected their house, they
left in the morning. 275 Shores’s wife stayed home alone during the day,
and had great fear being by herself. 276 Her chronic asthma spells got

269. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 94.
270. Id. at 20, 147.
271. Id. at 19.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 44–45. For daughter Helen, her anger and fear began with the 1953
confrontation with the youth driving by the house shouting racial epithets.
Id. That was the first of a number of incidents that “would test and mold
my youth and finally drive me far away from Birmingham, Alabama for
thirteen long years. Looking back, I now see that I stayed angry for a long
time. Anger became the fabric of my life and being.” Id. at 22.
274. For years, she tried to persuade her husband to move away from Alabama’s
Jim Crow laws and the physical violence the family experienced. Id. at 16.
Shores was born and raised in Alabama, and was committed to working on
behalf of Black people there. Id.
275. Id. at 147.
276. Id.
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worse, and there were times when she could hardly breathe.277
Moreover, their daughters had trouble sleeping, and one of them was
so fearful that she kept a gun hidden in case of an attack during the
night. 278
When Constance Baker Motley stayed at the Shores’ house, she
experienced great fear of still another bombing. 279 She reflected on the
fact that the “house had been bombed on several occasions” and that
there were armed men guarding the house:
It was the first time I had ever seen a real shotgun or machine
gun. I had bought my son a toy shotgun for Christmas, so I knew
what one looked like, but the real thing sent shivers up my spine.
Although I tried very hard to do so, that night I could not sleep.
Fortunately, when one is young, missing a night’s sleep is easy. 280

The bombing of the Shores house also caused great grief and sadness. One of the bombs not only killed the daughters’ beloved little dog;
it exploded the dog into pieces scattered around the yard. 281 The other
family dog was never seen again after the explosion. 282
Aside from the physical dangers, social pressures took a great
psychological toll. The ostracism that the Durr family endured in
Clifford Durr’s home town created great trauma as well. When the
277. Id.
278. Id. at 19.
279. Id. at 23–45. Barbara wrote that “My sister Helen and I lived our childhood
in unexpressed fear, always waiting for violence to erupt. Fortunately, we
simultaneously felt loved and protected by our parents, friends, and extended
family.” Id. at 27. She also identified times of intense fear of violence, such
as the early and mid-1950s when her father, Thurgood Marshall, and Constance Baker Motley challenged the exclusion of Autherine Lucy from the
all-white University of Alabama. Id. at 27. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text (discussing Lucy v. Adams).
280. Motley, supra note 181, at 123. However, she appeared otherwise to Arthur
Shores’s daughter Barbara, who said that “Motley was a big woman, quiet,
stoic, strong, and courageous. I sensed no fear in her at all . . . .” Lee &
Shores, supra note 1, at 146.
Motley also experienced great distress when she visited her clients, Dr. King
and Ralph Abernathy, in a rural Georgia jail where they occupied a six-foot
cell in one hundred degree heat: “The stench was so great I just jumped back
out of the door. I finally got up enough courage to go on it . . . . I never
believed it was possible for things like that to happen and nobody do
anything about it.” Motley Documentary, supra note 200. In her autobiography, Motley described the incident in more detail and concluded: “My
visit to the jail was the most horrendous experience of my life.” Motley,
supra note 181, at 159.
281. Lee & Shores, supra note 1, at 34.
282. Id. It is assumed that the dog ran away after the bombing. Id.
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family returned to his home town of Montgomery to live in 1951, Durr
tried to build a law practice and keep a low profile so he could fit into
the legal profession there. 283 However, within a few years, his
sympathies became more apparent. 284 Many of the Durr’s friends and
acquaintances abandoned them when they discovered that the Durrs
supported the civil rights activists. 285 Their stress and loneliness was
mitigated by their having some ongoing relationships, a small group of
white friends who shared their sympathies. 286
For Durr himself, his deep emotional attachment to the South came
in conflict with his views about the Constitution and the immorality of
racial discrimination. 287 As his wife suggested, “it was a very strange
kind of a double life that we lived.” 288 That added to the toll that the
ostracism took on both of them. 289
283. Brown, supra note 93, at 103.
284. Durr’s passion for justice led him to take on police brutality and loan shark
cases on behalf of Black victims. That also alienated him from many of his
old friends. Durr, supra note 2, at 306.
285. Id. at 305.
Durr referred to himself as “an alien” among his fellow southerners in
Montgomery. Brown, supra note 93, at 102. As with Arthur Shores’s wife,
Virginia Durr had times when she wanted to leave Alabama. She thought
that she made life miserable for her husband with her efforts to get him to
leave, but Clifford Durr considered Alabama his home and did not consider
offers from other parts of the country seriously. He loved Alabama and
refused to leave. As a result, the ostracism was more painful for Virginia
Durr than for her husband. Durr, supra note 2, at 288, 335.
When the newspaper reported on his car being burned, their phone rang all
night long with nothing but heavy breathing. They did get some sympathetic
calls, as well. Durr, supra note 196, at 301; Brown, supra note 196, at 187.
286. Clifford Durr maintained his active membership in two dining and debating
clubs. And they had a small group of white friends who shared their sympathies, with whom they could relax and be themselves. Salmond, supra note
2, at 179.
287. Brown, supra note 93, at 151.
288. Durr, supra note 2, at 324.
289. Perhaps the greatest ostracism occurred as a result of the publication of an
article in the New Yorker that used false names but revealed the couple’s
frank opinions about segregation in what they thought was an off the record
interview. Salmond, supra note 2, at 180–81. The article also added to the
decline of Durr’s legal practice. Id. at 181.
Virginia Durr said that “Cliff never got bitter, but he did get disappointed
and disillusioned.” Durr, supra note 2, at 324.
Durr even stopped going to the church that his family had attended and sat
in the same pew for many generations because church officials barred the
doors on Sunday to make sure Black people could not get in. The church
experience was extremely hurtful to Durr, because it seemed like such a
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The Durrs’ youngest two daughters seemed to suffer the most from
the ostracism. 290 The hostile actions of their classmates and teachers
made attending school a very painful experience. 291 Tilla took the brunt
of the hostility, experiencing constant harassment about her dissident
family from classmates and teachers: “the boycott made life simply
intolerable for her . . . . She was desperately unhappy.” 292 Finally, both
girls refused to go to school, and their parents sent them to boarding
school in the North. 293
The girls’ parents suffered as well. Clifford had times of becoming
despondent. 294 He was “deeply distressed” by the fact he could not make
a living or pay for his daughters’ education. 295 All of that took a great
toll on his pride. 296 At the same time, Virginia Durr “was desperately
unhappy living among people who disliked her.” 297
Virginia Durr said “it sometimes seems like a dream that we were
once respected, honored and sought after members of society.” 298 She
later reflected on the extreme toll the ostracism took on her family: “I
look back on it now and wonder that we stayed sane.” 299
It is not surprising that all of the dangers and threats would take a
psychological toll on the lawyers and their families. While the challenges
repudiation. He never attended another church or joined another one. Id. at
295.
290. Durr, supra note 2, at 288. Clifford Durr’s biography focused on the impact
on Tilla, suggesting that Lulah suffered some bad experiences but was too
young to have a full appreciation of what was going on. Salmond, supra
note 2, at 176–77.
291. Salmond, supra note 2, at 177; Durr, supra note 2, at 288.
292. Salmond, supra note 2, at 177. In order to ensure that she would have a
normal teenage experience, Clifford and Virginia sent her to a boarding
school in Massachusetts. Later, as Lulah faced ostracism as well, they also
sent her away to school. Id. at 187.
293. Durr, supra note 2, at 288. Virginia Durr said that their experience was
particularly hard on the children. “They were so miserable.” Id. at 335.
294. Salmond, supra note 2, at 178–79.
295. Id. at 179.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 187.
298. Salmond, supra note 2, at 179. Virginia Durr chose to rebel against the
racist regime of the South. In commenting on her autobiography, Studs
Terkel observed that she had abandoned privilege and challenged the way
of life: “Ostracism, bruises of all sorts, and defamation would be her lot.”
Durr, supra note 2, at v.
299. Durr, supra note 2, at 324. She noted that she and her husband had each
other to help get through this period, along with their children—although
none were at home—and support from some friends in the North. Id. at 324.
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were often different for Black and white lawyers, they were all serious
and pervasive for all of them and their families.

Conclusion
Fast-forwarding several decades to the late 20th century and early
21st century reveals other courageous civil rights lawyers in Alabama.
Bryan Stevenson heads the Montgomery-based Equal Justice Initiative
(EJI), which challenges racial injustice and advocates for equal treatment in the criminal justice system. 300 In his 2014 book “Just Mercy,”
he recounted his post-conviction representation of a Black man
convicted of killing a white woman and sentenced to death. 301 His client
had numerous alibi witnesses that placed him at his home at a church
fundraiser at the time the murder took place, and the only evidence
against him was a thoroughly implausible account fabricated by an
informant induced by the prosecutor. 302
Stevenson and his colleagues began to hear threats on their lives
because angry white people thought that they were trying to help get
a murderer out of prison. 303 The organization received multiple bomb
threats at the office, and Stevenson received death threats at home.304
It was tempting for Stevenson to ignore those threats; but not long
before that time, a Georgia civil rights lawyer was murdered when a
bomb sent to his office exploded. 305 And other bombs were sent to civil
rights offices and judge’s chambers in the South, as well. 306 So when a
300. See About EJI, Equal Just. Initiative, http://eji.org/about-eji [https://
perma.cc/P5R9-WN66] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (describing the history
and purpose of the organization).
301. Bryan Stevenson, Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and Redemption
(2014). In a uniquely cruel move, the police put him on death row shortly
after they arrested him. Id. at 52–53.
302. Id. at 50–52.
303. Id. at 146, 185, 203–04.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 203.
306. Id.
Similarly, the older Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), also in Montgomery, faced continuing threats of violence. See Our History, Southern
Poverty Law Ctr., https://www.splcenter.org/our-history [https://
perma.cc/Z6K8-LXF6] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). The organization has
focused, among other things, on trying to put white supremacist and other
extremist organizations out of business. Id. That mission, especially with the
organization’s successes in achieving its goal, makes it vulnerable to retaliation. In 1983, three Klansmen firebombed SPLC’s first offices. See SPLC
History: 1980s, Southern Poverty Law Ctr., https://www.splcenter.org
/about-us/our-history/splc-history-1980s [https://perma.cc/Z6K8-LXF6] (last
visited Dec. 29, 2016) (providing a detailed timeline of the SPLC throughout
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bomb threat came, EJI staff called the police, evacuated the office, and
waited outside while the police took bomb sniffing dogs through the
building and found no bomb. 307 After that, for weeks, the staff took mail
packages to the federal courthouse for X-ray screenings before opening
them. 308
Some scholars suggest that racial progress has been intermittent,
historically, and dependent on the confluence of several favorable factors. 309 In between, substantial backsliding has occurred. 310 With periodic
renewed polarization around racial issues, civil rights activists risk
facing greater dangers as they pursue their goals. That is likely the case
for the lawyers that represent them, as well. The courage that the lawyers discussed here demonstrated can provide a model for those that
follow in their footsteps. With the uncertain racial implications of the
2016 election, it is clear that the need for courageous lawyers remains.
This is not just a story that is safely in the distant past. Fred Gray and
his courageous colleagues set a very high bar for their 21st century
counterparts.

the 1980s); Solicitation letter from Morris Dees, Founder of SPLC, to Leonard
Rubinowitz, author, (Oct. 3, 2016) (on file with author).
Extremists posed an ongoing threat to the SPLC’s building and staff. One
2016 threat, among many others, claimed that: “We are going to blow you
. . . straight to hell in the near future for all of your lies, propaganda, and
hate that you spew out.” Id. The letter also referred to an FBI warning that
an organization was planning on targeting the founder and another employee. Both of them “were forced to take [their] family members to a safe
location.” Id. He also reported that more than two dozen extremists had been
jailed because of plots to kill staff or attack the building. The letter was seeking
contributions to pay for a high-tech security system and expert security
officers. Id. As a result, a significant part of the organization’s budget went
to security for the building and the staff. Id.
307. Stevenson, supra note 301, at 203–04.
On one of the calls to the office threatening to bomb the office, the receptionist said to the caller threatening to bomb the office: “Why are you doing
this? You’re scaring us.” The caller responded “I’m doing you a favor. I want
y’all to stop what you’re doing. My first option is not to kill everybody, so
you better get out of there now! Next time there won’t be a warning.” Id.
308. Id. at 203.
In a conversation with Montgomery activists Rosa Parks, Johnnie Carr, and
Virginia Durr, Ms. Carr responded to Stevenson’s explanation of the
challenges he faced: “That’s why you have to be brave, brave, brave.” The
need for courage continued just as when Rosa Parks had refused to give up
her bus seat decades earlier. Id. at 291–93.
309. See generally Philip A. Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady
March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (1999)
(providing three factors that, when concurred, allows for racial progress).
310. Id.
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